Hybrid Warfare and the Wagner Group - The New Mercenarism Era - Post-Blackwater

The hybrid conflicts became more continuous these last small localized conflicts, the methods of conflicts are involving local people, rebels and governments interested on geopolitical projections.

The great problem is that nowadays, the conflicts are based on government economy and power influence on other nations. The nations into countries are searching for their independence and the interest on mantain that cultural region and cities under the federalist central government are into the respect of the constitution or legality on the territory imposed to these groups on being a part of a country.

The local men that wants their culture and own laws are requested by small arms units and other countries that want the same geopolitical influence, and these mercenary hiring are taking the place world wide, with people who are not part of that game, to fight a war, that is not part of that people. But joining to people around, the local conflicts becomes global and this nowadays mercenarism is jointed to private business administration, and with some holes in the supra national organisms, they spawned a new mercenary era, focused on business and governamental game.

According to the article A Clash of Cultures: Post-Modern Military Education in Modern and Pre-Modern Contexts, by Dr. Laura R. Cleary:

http://www.military.ie/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/academic_conference/A_Clash_of_Cultures_L_CLEARY.pdf

Moskos, Williams and Segal argued that the post-modern military is characterized by five major organisational changes: 

• The increasing interpenetrability of civilian and military spheres, both structurally and culturally; 
• The diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch of service, rank and combat versus support roles; 
• The change in military purpose from fighting wars, to missions that would not be considered military in the traditional sense; 
• The increased use of military forces in international missions;
• The internationalisation of the military forces themselves.

The proposal is different from the primal Neo-Colonialism mercenarism, the adventurers, fighting in unknowns lands, with primal warfare tactics, war machines, tanks, jeeps with machine guns, granades and a desire of pathfinders. This new mercenarism supports on RMA techonoly and the run for best capability on mapping via satelite, the request for the geopolitical influence, natural resources and implementation of international banks and international money in determined regions.

The contemporary mercenarism, nowadays, was changed in some steps, first was the Pre and Post Sandline International and Executive Outcomes. The second, in my views, is the post-Blackwater. And the new age of Mercenarism is with Wagner Group.

The military industry established institutions to promote offshore capacity of operation in military scenario, governamental and diplomatic politics and transnational industry implementation, economic stability based on international money and a legislation capable to assure that one of the parts, the most effective politicaly, economicaly and military, will left without suffer any retaliation.

Also a local and international media that assure the political stability will be solid with a 'contra' media, with the same redators, dictating how the game is being played and making the pro-media, into the top of the news. The spread of fake news is a new option of psy-war.

In the battle for the east and west and Eurasia and Africa, the global position one part is being under constant fire of the anti-globalists, the usage of mercenarism is a point that is an answer of the last wars, caused by the globalists.

Mercenarism is effective to assure that the wars will be fought without the governments being accused of a illegal war. UN don't support any war, but never could stop one... Fucking globalists... 

The result is that the national globalism is the one position by the 'hegemon' countries, that want to stop the globalistic institutions, but implement their power globaly, like the Neocon and the Global Americanism. The Chinese influence on world wide economy and comerce. Now the Russia influence at the anti-Global institutions.

Воевал за еду: Правоохранителям сдался еще один экс-наемник "ДНР"

36-летний экс-наемник дежурил на блокпостах террористов за продовольственные пайки, а после - сбежал в РФ

https://112.ua/ato/voeval-za-edu-na-donbasse-pravoohranitelyam-sdalsya-eshhe-odin-eks-naemnik-dnr-442623.html

На Донбассе правоохранителям сдался еще один экс-наемник так называемой "ДНР" из Николаевки. Об этом сообщает пресс-служба Национальной полиции.

Отмечается, что 36-летний экс-наемник дежурил на блокпостах террористов за продовольственные пайки, а после освобождения населенного пункта выехал в РФ. Вернувшись домой, он сначала скрывал службу в "ДНР", а потом добровольно пришел в территориальное подразделение полиции. Сейчас в отношении него проводится проверка.

По его словам, в рядах боевиков он начал служить в апреле 2014 года.

"Мужчина решил "помочь землякам" в "рождении" фейковой республики, а потому согласился на дежурство на местном блокпосте. За услуги с ним рассчитывались продуктами питания, алкоголем и сигаретами", - рассказали в полиции.

Перед освобождением территории района от оккупации мужчина покинул место дислокации и уехал за границу Украины, скрываясь в РФ, а через полгода вернулся домой.

Сейчас в отношении участника незаконных вооруженных формирований открыто уголовное производство по ч. 2 ст. 260 ("Создание не предусмотренных законом военизированных или вооруженных формирований") Уголовного кодекса Украины.

В полиции отметили, что после тщательной проверки и установления всех обстоятельств он получит шанс на освобождение от уголовной ответственности согласно ч. 6 ст. 260 Уголовного кодекса Украины.

Напомним, в конце марта в Бахмутском районе Донецкой области полицейским сдался гражданин РФ, который нес службу в рядах боевиков.

Тогда же в полиции отметили, что с начала операции "Мигрант", которая проходит с 21 февраля, полицейские Донецкой области выявили 78 нелегальных мигрантов. 9 человек принудительно возвращены в страны происхождения, 23 запрещен въезд в Украину.

"Wagner Group:" Russian secret mercenaries in Syria

"Wagner Group" consists of experienced fighters commissioned by Russian Ministry of Defense, but officially this unit does not exist

https://112.international/ukraine-top-news/wagner-group-russian-secret-mercenaries-in-syria-12123.html

Oleg served in Syria in a military unit, which on paper did not officially exist, but which was known as the "Wagner Group;" he fought on the side of the Syrian pro-government forces. It was formed of experienced fighters commissioned by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Oleg took part in the battles for the liberation of Palmyra. His salary was 4,500 euros a month plus bonuses.

Russia launched a military operation in Syria, torn by civil war, more than a year ago - 30 September 2015. Since then a lot of things have changed. If then the house of Assad was held on the balance of the death, after the Russian intervention loyalists managed to repel Palmyra in the Islamic state and to win a landslide victory in Aleppo.

All these successes badly battered in the hell of war, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) would have been unthinkable without the support of Russia. It causes the air and missile attacks on opponents of the government forces, supplying arms and trains some units.

Officially Russian contingent does not contain soldiers that perform the "dirty work" - "Wagner Group". Such a department or a private military company does not formally exist. In fact, the Russians had time to do some fighting in different parts of Syria against the Islamic state, and against the "green" - the various factions that the West considered the moderate opposition.

"I was an employee, and I do not care about this war. I like this job if I did not like it, I would not work there," Oleg says.

Oleg is not worried that he could be called an assassin, "That's right, I went for money."

"Wagner Group" is no ordinary private military company. It is a miniature army. In some circles, fighters of the subdivision are called musicians; the unit commander chose the name after the German composer Richard Wagner. According to some reports, for this callsign hiding 47-year-old lieutenant colonel Dmitry Utkin. He served in the Special Forces in the Pechora. In Syria, not for the first time - before it is officially worked with the private military company known as "Slavic body."

The company hired to guard the captains of the Syrian oil fields and columns in Deir ez-Zor. However, in October 2013 in the city of Al-Suhna guards got into serious trouble: have entered into an unequal battle with the jihadists of the Islamic State.

Following these events, the contract between the customer and the guards broke. According to Oleg, they did not agree the payment, "Syrian bumps" refused to pay extra for a dangerous job and began to threaten the Russians. "Slavic body" went out of Syria.

"Wagner Group" has other, more serious customer - the Ministry of Defense of Russian Federation. Before rollover Syria autumn 2015 "musicians" were three-month training at the site Molkyno in direct vicinity of the base of a separate brigade of the Main Intelligence Directorate. In Syria "Wagner Group" got on airplanes. And it's not ships "Aeroflot", smiling, says Oleg. Fighters carried on transport planes 76 Division of VAT, which is stationed in the Pskov region.

Equipment, including artillery and tanks, sea tossed by the so-called "Syrian Express" - the Russian Navy ships from Novorossiysk in Tartus. From various sources that the group sent to Syria twice for a short time in autumn 2015 to participate in a long-term operation in the winter-spring of next year. Each trip - a separate contract. Generally, people from "Wagner Group"  are experienced fighters who were a few conflicts. Although the recruitment ads in newspapers not see, the group had problems with a set of experts.

Oleg acknowledges that went to Wagner's not the first time - do not trust: "Practically, get an acquaintance and nothing more. As such a free set there. When typing conduct several tests: the use of alcohol and drugs. More physical tests."

Among "Wagner Group" there are many of those who fought on the side Donbas separatists. They are additionally checked on a polygraph. There may even ask whether they are agents of the FSB. The group has its own security department, which is struggling with the leaks. Find photos condottiere Russian network - a great success. This offense, which entails severe penalties for those guilty.

In Syria, the soldiers were paid 300,000 rubles (about 4,500 euros) a month plus bonuses. There was also a kind of insurance system: the wounding of about 300 000 and the cost of treatment in hospitals of quality. For death - five million rubles family. Although legally contract with a group of Wagner - worthless piece of paper, Oleg confirms: paid every last penny and more. But full security are not talking.

- Do you have at least some protection?

- From what?

- From the state.

- I think not.

Syrian Civil War is ruthless; interests of many countries are intertwined here. On both sides of the front are fighting hundreds of groups with different motivations, but none can deny cruelty. Why this senseless war Russia Oleg prefers not to think. "Smart wars I have not yet seen," he says.

According to Oleg, the government-controlled areas dominated by mainly secular lifestyle. Woman in burqa - a rarity, though many wear the hijab. In the liberated areas of the local population Latakia most Assad. "In Latakia range of portraits of Assad and Hafez Assad - father of the president. And local show no relationship. This is a civil war - you are either for or against. If you try to be neutral, then you will most likely be bad," describes Oleg.

Local treat Russians well, and Syrian troops almost worship. "We are for them - move. I mean, they are very happy that the Russians arrived. Finally, they think, again, I can sit and drink mate, let the Russians fighting - says Oleg. - When we arrived in one city, they are all night dancing in the streets, fired into the air with joy. But they then upset when we left."

Wealthy Murek after the departure of the Russians "musicians" Syrians left. Years of war depleted manpower of the Syrian Arab Army. Coupled with the lack of fighting spirit and military training, combat-ready units are only a few: "First, they have no training, they cannot even shoot. Secondly, they have a terrible attitude to arms: they did not even clean."

Largely because, according to different sources, "Wagner Group" was used as the fire department - it has acted where it was most difficult and, except for operations in Palmyra, small groups.

In Latakia because of the inaction of Syrians "Wagner group" suffered significant losses. Oleg transfers heard from colleagues circumstances of the war with poorly concealed irritation. On the day the Russians were to attack the Syrians cover the mountain and to suppress enemy firing points on the neighboring heights. After the artillery barrage Syrians refused to go on the attack. Group Wagner had to work on myself. The rise of the mountain took place without incident, but in the upper Russians were under fire from three sides.

"Mountain is totally bold. If you are not in the trenches, this is the end. If there are wounded, they are needed to  be evacuated. How many people are retiring? At least two. The path on which the boys raised came under fire; they could not go. They had to go down mined slope," says Oleg.

The Russians tried to raise allies attack force - jumped them in the trenches and shot at his feet, but they have not budged. "And the Syrians did not stop the fire on the top. So, our shot in the ass. It was hell," complains Oleg.

According to him, the fall of the "Wagner Group" lost in killed about 15 people. Half of them in one day: the gap ammunition in camp. What was Oleg knows sounding version of the American mortar shells or bombs. Winter-spring losses were more exact figures but it could not be called.

This is not the only reason why Oleg does not like government forces. "They steal everything that is not fixed. I saw how they dragged the toilet," he explains.

However, Oleg is not a high opinion about the "boom" - the so-called armed opposition, which is considered moderate in the West. According to him, under the concept of Free Syrian Army should understand the hundreds of groups, including the Islamist wing that occasionally fight each other for territory: "They also need something to eat." Although acknowledges: "Greens are different."

In 2016, "Wagner Group" united and moved in Palmyra to fight the Islamic state. If the fall in Syria were about 600 mercenaries in the winter-spring of their number doubled. "When Palmyra was easier because we all drove to the pile and we performed a holistic task," says Oleg.

ISIS fighters proved themselves as fanatical fighters: they sow fear among Iraqis and Syrians. Oleg also indicates that certain good fight Islamists from Europe, but they are not faced with. "Black" - also different. They are local militias: the fighter machine and nothing more. Fighting a "black" also did not know how. There was a case. Observers reported - arrived on unknown machines lined wedge and go at us. Their artillery was covered with machine nobody shot - put all "- he recalls.

However, on the side of the Islamists, there are obvious advantages: "They are very competent. Our occupied the ridge, and they went from Palmyra: Stalingrad suit did not. Why do it - people have saved and went away. So always small injections are constantly attacking the Syrians."

After completing the task, Wagner group left the city. Laura got the winners of Syrian troops who entered the empty city. However, the Russians won the victory of government forces are not retained: December 11, 2016 reflected the Islamists Palmyra.

The fall of the city - eloquent proof that despite all the recent advances, the war is far from over. Supporters of Assad are not able to operate everywhere - not enough strength and specialists. And not only at the front, "Wagner Group" used including repair techniques.

"In Hama, there is a huge armored plant. Before the arrival of our guys, Syrians repaired two tanks per month. When we arrived ours, they immediately began to give out 30 tanks a month. They worked from morning to evening: they were there, the poor, even in a city not allowed. Our all gone, and these repairers there remained," says Oleg.

"Wagner Group" brought from Syria in late spring this year. The latest operation was the Russians sweep neighborhoods near the airport near Palmyra. "Among the palm trees and the labyrinth of stone fences," - says mercenary.

Since then, signs of Russian participation in the war is not recorded. After the liberation of Palmyra Ministry of Defense held in the ancient amphitheater city concert. Played music of Prokofiev. It is possible that musicians can be in the city again. Only it will be "musicians" with guns - illusory "Wagner Group." Oleg is ready, "Of course I will go. Africa or wherever. I do not care where, I really like this job."

الوجود العسكري الروسي الخفي في سوريا

http://katehon.com/ar/article/lwjwd-lskry-lrwsy-lkhfy-fy-swry

على الرغم من أن الحملة في سوريا قد انتهت رسميا، إلا أن الوجود العسكري الروسي يبقى موجودا في البلاد وعدد هؤلاء العسكريين غير مرجح أن ينخفض كثيرا في المستقبل.

لا تزال الأسئلة مستمرة لاحتواء الوجود العسكري الروسي في سوريا، لا سيما في ضوء مبادرات دبلوماسية جديدة من قبل الولايات المتحدة التي تحاول التعرف على دور القوة العسكرية الروسية في تغيير الأبعاد الإستراتيجية للصراع في المنطقة. يوم 14 يوليو كان من المقرر عقد اجتماع لمناقشة العرض الأمريكي الجديد الذي يرتب التنسيق العسكري بين القوتين الأكبر فكان الاجتماع بين الرئيس الروسي فلاديمير بوتين ووزير الخارجية سيرغي لافروف مع وزير الخارجية الاميركي جون كيري.

هذه الموجة الجديدة من النشاط الدبلوماسي تثير عدة أسئلة: ما الذي يحدث فعلا في سوريا؟ ما مدى الدعم الروسي العسكري الإضافي المتوقع لسوريا؟ ومن الذين يقاتلون بالفعل على أرض الواقع لصالح روسيا؟

رسميا ليس لروسيا ليس وجود عسكري حقيقي في سوريا. يوم 14 مارس، أعلن فلاديمير بوتين أن الجيش الروسي قد أتم مهمته بنجاح في سوريا، وأمر بسحب الجزء الرئيسي للقوات الفضائية الروسية من سوريا. الطائرات الأولى غادرت سوريا في اليوم التالي.ومع ذلك، سرعان ما تبين أن الجيش الروسي يواصل القيام بدور نشط في الصراع السوري. وعلاوة على ذلك، فقد بدأت القوات المسلحة الروسية في سورية تعاني من بعض الخسائر، بما في ذلك فقدان بعض الأفراد العسكريين. في الأشهر الأربعة بعد قرار سحب القوات العسكرية الرئيسية من سوريا، فقدت موسكو ثمانية جنود (خسارتين غير ناتجتين عن أعمال قتالية). في المقابل، خلال "المرحلة النشطة" من العملية من 30 سبتمبر 2015 إلى 14 مارس 2016 فقدت القوات الروسية  خمسة عناصر فقط (خسارة واحدة غير ناتجة عن أعمال قتالية).

ما الذي أنجزته روسيا في سوريا قبل الانسحاب

الحملة الروسية في سوريا أظهرت بوضوح القدرات العسكرية الكبيرة للقوات الفضائية الروسية وقدرتها على الانتشار السريع. مما لا شك فيه أن ردة فعل موسكو السريعة على الأحداث في سوريا في سبتمبر 2015 انقذت الرئيس السوري بشار الأسد وحكومته، بل وغيرت مجرى تيار الحرب.

وعلاوة على ذلك، نجح الكرملين في التوصل إلى هدنة هشة في المنطقة بين الأكراد والمعارضة العلمانية وبين دمشق. في ضوء ذلك استغرب الكثيرون تلك المفاجأة عندما قرر الرئيس الروسي في مارس سحب جزء كبير من الجيش من سوريا وأعلن أن "المهام قد تم تنفيذها وإنجازها عموما".

ومع ذلك، واصل الجيش الروسي المشاركة بنشاط في الصراع السوري، لذلك من المنطقي أن نسأل: ماهي الحاجة التي دعت الكرملين للإعلان عن انسحاب قواته؟ يبدو غريبا ذلك وخاصة أن الحرب ما زالت مستمرة، والجيش السوري لم يحقق النجاح في ميدان المعركة.على الرغم من ذلك، روسيا أنجزت بالفعل كل المهام في سوريا خلال الجزء الأول من الحملة العسكرية.

أولا، الغرب بحكم الواقع اعترف بالرئيس السوري بشار الأسد وسمح لوفده بالجلوس على طاولة المفاوضات.

ثانيا، وصلت الأطراف المتنازعة إلى نوع من الهدنة يسمح بنوع من التنسيق بين المعارضة المعتدلة والحكومة والأكراد.

ثالثا، القوات الفضائية الروسية نشرت المدربين التشغيليين في القواعد الجوية السورية، وبالتالي يمكن الآن بسهولة إعادة توزيعها في وقت قصير.

رابعا، من خلال إطلاق صواريخ مجنحة عالية الدقة من البحر الأبيض المتوسط، أثبتت روسيا قدرتها على دعم دمشق بضربات من خارج أراضيها.

وخامسا، لم يكن هناك لحظة أفضل بالنسبة لموسكو لكي تعلن عن نجاح انجاز مهماتها في سورية من مارس عام 2016. وبدعم عسكري روسي حرر الجيش السوري تدمر، وهي مدينة ذات أهمية هائلة للتراث العالمي. وكانت هذه المدينة تدمر بشكل مستمر من قبل المتطرفين الإسلاميين. وتمت تغطية هذا الانتصار على نطاق واسع من قبل وسائل الإعلام الروسية وكان من المفترض من خلال ذلك تأكيد فعالية الدعم الروسي للأسد لكل المجتمع الدولي.

لقد أصبح من الواضح تماما أن الجيش الروسي لا يزال في سوريا. وبعد مقتل اثنين من الطيارين الروس على متن مروحية قرب تدمر بتاريخ 8 يوليو، نحن نعلم أن بعض الروس لا يزالون يعملون على  المعدات السورية أو بالقرب من ساحة المعركة. حادث طائرة الهليكوبتر من طراز MI-25 التي أسقطت في 8 تموز، لا يزال يثير المناقشات سواء أكانت تنتمي إلى القوات الجوية الروسية أو السورية.حتى قبل إعلان بوتين الانسحاب الجزئي من سوريا، بدأت وسائل الإعلام الغربية والروسية بالتكهن حول استخدام روسيا القوات البرية هناك. جاء ذلك على الرغم من تأكيد الكرملين أن الحملة في سوريا هيةعملية جوية بحتة دون الحاجة إلى قوات على الأرض.

ولكن يجب أن لا ننسى أن هناك عاملين مهمين جدا. أولا، أعلن بوتين أنه لن يسحب سوى الجزء الرئيسي من قوات الفضاء في سوريا ولن يسحب جميع الوحدات العسكرية الروسية بالكامل من مطار حميميم وقاعدة طرطوس.

ثانيا، يوجد اتفاق بشأن المساعدات العسكرية بين روسيا وسوريا يسمح لموسكو بإرسال عدد من المدربين والمستشارين العسكريين الضرورين للجيش السوري لمعرفة كيفية تشغيل الأسلحة الجديدة وتدريب العاملين عليها. في الواقع يسمح هذا لروسيا بإرسال أعداد كبيرة جدا من الأشخاص إلى سوريا. تاريخ طويل من المستشارين العسكريين في سوريا.

في سوريا ليس غريبا العمل مع المستشارين العسكريين. خلال الحرب الباردة ظهرت مجموعة من "الخبراء العسكريين السوفييت" في سوريا في وقت مبكر من عام 1956. ووفقا لمصادر أمريكية في بداية عام 1980 بلغت هذه المجموعة حوالي 8000 شخص. هيئة الأركان العامة للقوات المسلحة في الاتحاد الروسي تعترف أنه خلال الفترة من 1956-1991، خدم 16000 من العسكريين في سوريا قتل أو مات منهم بسبب المرض 44 شخصا. في الواقع شارك هؤلاء الجنود السوفييت في جميع أنواع الأنشطة في وحدات تدريب المشاة وللحفاظ على الطيران السوري.

وبقي عدد كبير من الخبراء العسكريين في سوريا بعد تفكك الاتحاد السوفيتي حتى العام 2013  عندما خلال الحرب الأهلية في سوريا عندما أعلنت وزارة الشؤون الخارجية رسميا في روسيا عدم وجود أي جنود روس في البلاد.

وهكذا، فلدى روسيا خبرة واسعة من التعاون العسكري مع سوريا. ومن الواضح أنه  مرة أخرى، تماما كما كان في العهد السوفيتي، ذهب المستشارون الروس ليدربوا الجيش السوري ويقدموا الاستشارات للضباط الذين يخدمون بشار الأسد. ويتم ذلك في إطار اتفاقات ثنائية في مجال التعاون العسكري التقني، وليس ضمن العملية العسكرية الروسية في البلاد التي لا تزال جارية حتى الآن.انتقاما لإسقاط المروحيات الروسية، قامت ستة قاذفات استراتيجية من طراز تو-22M3 من الاراضي الروسية باستهداف مواقع "الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام". على الرغم من ذلك، فقد كان يهدف هذا، وفقا لبعض الخبراء، أولا وقبل كل شيء إلى إظهار قوة روسيا (الطيران الروسي التكتيكي الذي بقي في سوريا والقادر على معالجة المهام الأكثر تحديدا)، وأظهرت روسيا أيضا أنه إذا لزم الأمر يمكنها إن تقدم دعما فعالا للحكومة في سوريا من الأراضي الروسية في غضون ساعات.

الصراع العسكري في سوريا والعراق يمتد لفترة طويلة وليس من الممكن حله بسرعة. الراديكاليون الإسلاميون فقدوا المعارك والمدن وتراجعوا، ولكن للأسف لأفكارهم شعبية كبيرة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط. للأسف لا يحظى نظام الأسد، بشعبية في الغرب، وهو لا يزال البديل الحقيقي الوحيد للدولة الإرهابية، وعلى العكس من بروكسل وواشنطن فإن موسكو تفكر بطريقة عملية لدعم السلطة السياسية الحقيقية، وليس مجموعات متباعدة من "المعارضات الديمقراطية المعتدلة".

للأسف، يعني هذا الدعم أن يدفع بعض الجنود الروس حياتهم. وهم من المتخصصين أو المدربين أو المستشارين لتعزيز فعالية القوات الموالية للحكومة السورية، ومن المرجح بقاؤهم في المنطقة لفترة طويلة. المتطرفون الإسلاميون لا يرون أي فارق بين "المقاتلين" و"غير المقاتلين" ولذلك سيكون الجنود الذين يقعون  في أيديهم في موقع لا يحسدهم عليه أحد. عدد الأفراد العسكريين الذين تم إرسالهم إلى سوريا قد لا يتم تخفيضه بشكل كبير، على الرغم من عدم وجود صورة واضحة عن مدة وجودهم. ستواصل قوات الفضاء الروسية أيضا عملها في البلاد كما سيواصل الجيش السوري عمله وهو في حاجة إليها لتنفيذ هجومه ضد مواقع الجماعات الإسلامية المتطرفة.

War, Business and ‘Hybrid’ Warfare: The Case of the Wagner Private Military Company (Part One)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 60

By: Sergey Sukhankin

April 19, 2018 06:02 PM Age: 2 months

https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-hybrid-warfare-the-case-of-the-wagner-private-military-company-part-one/

On March 27, the Russian government watered down the Duma bill proposing to legalize Private Military Companies (Chastnye Voennie Company—PMC) (Interfax, March 27). The parliamentary initiative was unanimously rejected by the Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Federal Guard Service of the Russian Federation (FSO). Incidentally, previously such key figures as Sergei Lavrov (the head of the MFA), Dmitry Rogozin (Russian deputy prime minister on defense and space industry) and prominent siloviki (such as Colonel General Vladimir Shamanov) had given support to the PMC bill (Kommersant, January 15). Moreover, on April 12, 2012, then–prime minister Vladimir Putin called these structures “an instrument for the realization of national interests abroad without the direct participation of the state” (Vz.ru, April 11, 2012). Yet, the real situation is far more complicated than appears on the surface.

The first serious attempt to legalize PMCs in Russia was voiced in March 2016, by parliamentary deputies Gennady Nosovko and Oleg Mikheev from the Spravedlivaya Rossiya (A Just Russia) political party (Chvk.info, accessed April 15, 2018). However, their proposal (which notably did not allow Russian PMCs to take part in military conflicts abroad) was vehemently opposed by military intelligence (GRU) and the FSB. In many ways, this opposition from the security services played a key role in the legislative initiative’s eventual failure.

Despite a legal prohibition on mercenary activities (Article 359 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), Russia has actively used military “volunteers” since 1992, when members of the “Rubicon” group (coordinated by the FSB) were sent to Bosnia (the city of Višegrad, a site of Serb-led ethnic cleansing) to take part in local hostilities (Informnapalm.org, November 23, 2015).

Since 2008, no fewer than ten PMCs have emerged in Russia, of which the most well-known had long been Slavonic Corps Limited. Registered in 2013, in Hong-Kong, Slavonic Corps was founded by members of the Moran Security Group, Vadim Gusev and Yevgeny Sidorov (subsequently, both men would be accused of “mercenary” activities and sentenced to three years in prison). The majority of the “security experts” hired by the organization were comprised of former members of the Russian federal riot police (OMON) and interior ministry special forces; and most had combat experience in regional conflicts (such as in the North Caucasus and Tajikistan). According to Russian sources, employees received a highly lucrative monthly salary of $4,000 and were entitled to $20,000 for severe injuries or $40,000 to their families in case of death. However, the unsuccessful October 2013 armed operation near the city of al-Sukhnah (proximate to the city of Homs), virtually put an end to the Slavonic Corps, thus opening up new opportunities to the so-called Wagner Group (Fontanka.ru, November 14, 2013).

Created by Dmitry “Wagner” Utkin (who formerly served in a Pskov-based unit of the GRU), the new formation was reportedly used as a vanguard of Russian land operations in Syria until last February, when it was hit hard by forces headed by the United States, suffering at least several hundred dead at Deir el-Zour (see EDM, February 15, 20, 2018). News of the deadly rout was first presented by Igor Strelkov, the former “minister of defense” of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic, in eastern Ukraine (Apostrophe.ua, January 7). It was later reiterated by then-head of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Michael Pompeo, who mentioned “a couple hundred” Russians killed in Syria (Newsru.com, April 12).

The emergence and subsequent rise of the Wagner PMC is frequently traced to apparent financial support from Kremlin-connected Russian billionaire Yevgeny Prigozhin, whose wealth is estimated at 7.14 billion rubles ($120 million)—and the actual figure may be much higher. Nicknamed “Putin’s chef,” Prigozhin is the owner of Concord-M, a catering company that serves the St. Petersburg and the Moscow school systems as well as around 90 percent of the entire Russian military, which gave him approximately $1 billion worth of contracts. Additionally, investigators in Russia and the US have concluded that Concord-M allegedly stood behind the so-called Russian “troll farms” that produced and disseminated online anti-Western propaganda and disinformation campaigns (Meduza.io, June 9, 2016; see EDM, February 26, 2018).

It needs to be underscored that, to date, Russian investigative journalists have not been able to establish a direct link between Prigozhin and the Wagner Group. Nonetheless, the company Evro Polis (also close to Prigozhin), whose main business activities revolve around hydrocarbon extraction, could shed some new light to the issue. Established in 2016, in Krasnogorsk (Moscow Oblast), the company opened an office in Damascus, in May 2017, after allegedly receiving a sizable share (25 percent) of Syria’s oil and natural gas extraction business (Svoboda.org, June 27, 2017). It is highly unlikely that private businessmen (even powerful, well-connected ones, such as Prigozhin) would be the only stakeholders in this kind of major energy-sector deal with a foreign state. Rather, the prospect of Russia establishing control over the Syrian energy market—and the “huge financial possibilities for some people”—would automatically put Moscow in the leading position. According to Mikhail Krutihin, a partner at the RusEnergy Consulting Agency, at this juncture the main player could become state-owned Russian energy giant Rosneft, which already has vested interests in the Middle East (Mbk.media, February 18, 2018).

Another firm looking to scoop Prigozhin’s Syria energy deal may be STG Group (Stroytransgaz), linked to powerful Russian oligarch and close Putin associate Gennady Tymchenko. Stroytransgaz has already “managed to re-initiate the extraction of natural gas near Homs and the construction of gas-processing facilities near al-Raqqa” (Ehorussia.com, February 20). It, therefore, may have been no accident that the Conoco gas field in Deir el-Zour, generally regarded as part of Stroytransgaz’s sphere of interest inside Syria (RBC, June 27, 2017), was the site where the Prigozhin-backed Wagner Group forces were decimated as they unexpectedly pushed east of the Euphrates River.

Private Military Companies like the Wagner Group should, thus, be seen as a potential tool used by major Russian energy companies to achieve their objectives (current and more far-reaching) in war-torn Syria. Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that such “business-related” activities constitute merely one side of the bigger picture involving Russian PMCs.

War, Business and ‘Hybrid’ Warfare: The Case of the Wagner Private Military Company (Part Two)

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 15 Issue: 61

By: Sergey Sukhankin

April 23, 2018 06:11 PM Age: 2 months

https://jamestown.org/program/war-business-and-hybrid-warfare-the-case-of-the-wagner-private-military-company-part-two/

On March 28, Russian media presented information that members of the Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner may have been spotted in the East Ghouta region (southwestern Syria), coordinating a “normalization of the post-war situation.” The same sources also claimed that Wagner forces are currently involved in fighting on the side of Omar al-Bashir in South Sudan (Lenta.ru, March 28). This information might have crucial meaning in ascertaining both the actual and prospective tasks performed by Wagner versus other Russian PMCs (see Part One, EDM, April 19).

Indeed, Wagner is by no means a trivial example of an ordinary Russian PMC: its composition, command and control (C2), and actual tasks performed make it distinctive from a standard PMC, whose prime undertakings generally boil down to “combat support” missions—not carrying out military operations.

In terms of makeup and recruitment, Wagner is a complex combination of elite professionals (apparently, recruited through the channels controlled by the security services, or “siloviki”), semi-amateurs (recruited via war veteran and Cossack organizations), and “cannon fodder” (former criminals, amateurs and persons with a shady past) (Znak.com, February 13). Various media and analytical investigations—such as the one carried out by the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) in 2016—pertaining to the deaths of Russian recruits in Ukraine and Syria, have revealed that the majority of casualties have not been members of Russian elite special forces (RBC, March 23, 2016). Some sources are even more straightforward in their assessments, arguing that “top-notch professionals do not join Wagner” (Lenta.ru, February 21, 2018).

This, however, might be an underestimation: members of Wagner are being prepared at the Molkino (Krasnodar Krai) training center (its modernization has been handsomely financed by the Russian Ministry of Defense), where the 10th special forces military intelligence service (GRU) brigade is stationed. Thus, there clearly are visible ties between Wagner and both the GRU and the defense ministry (Fontanka.ru, August 21, 2017). That said, the full authority standing behind Wagner may be a “triumvirate” composed of the GRU, the Ministry of Defense, as well as the Federal Security Service (FSB). Reporting by the independent Russian magazine RBC from two years ago suggests that, in Latakia and Aleppo, Russian so-called “special forces” (approximately 2,500 persons) operations were coordinated by the GRU and FSB (RBC, August 25, 2016). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, in 2016 it was claimed that Wagner constituted the vanguard of Russian military operations on land, and its effectiveness was high. This assessment, however, fails to capture some crucial transformations that have occurred between 2014 and 2018.

The majority of sources (Fontanka.ru, August 21, 2017) trace the emergence of Wagner to 2014, when it took an active part in hostilities in the Donbas region. In the second stage of this private military company’s history (from March 2016), its effectiveness reached a zenith, culminating in Wagner’s assistance in the capture of the city of Palmyra from the Islamic State (see EDM, March 29, 2016; March 22, 2017).

Success was secured by a combination of the following factors:

– the relatively high quality of weaponry employed by Wagner forces (T-72 main battle tanks, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, D-30 122-millimeter howitzers);

– the quantity of personnel (out of 2,349 combat troops, the well-trained “core” played an essential role); and

– a steady structure of the C2 system (central command and three branches responsible for different tasks).

However, at the third stage of the company’s brief history (from January 2017), Wagner has experienced some crucial transformations, reflected in both the nature of the tasks/operations performed (mainly the protection of the Shaer natural gas/oil field and similar sites) and the decreasing quality of weaponry available as well as of its personnel more generally. For example, investigative reporting suggests that in the past year or so, the main sources of new recruits have been Cossacks and foreigners (primarily, from Donbas). This shift is chiefly associated with a change in the financial situation: in the past, financial backing came from Kremlin-linked oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin (see EDM, February 26, 2018), but since 2017 (after an alleged dispute between the billionaire and the defense ministry), the Syrian government has been covering Wagner’s main expenses, which has resulted in a decline in its operational capabilities. However, this situation may be temporary (Fontanka.ru, August 21, 2017).

The tasks and responsibilities performed by Wagner mean this formation cannot be classified as just an ordinary Russian PMC. Its “business-related” activities (such as protecting oil and gas fields in Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan), which clearly cater to specific business interests (Svoboda.org, June 27, 2017), are notably supplemented by directives coming from the Russian state. Participation in hostilities in southeastern Ukraine and in Syria (and also potentially in Sudan and the Balkans), has effectively turned this “private company” into a Kremlin weapon of “hybrid”/non-linear warfare.

At the same time, the staunch opposition coming from the siloviki to legally recognize Russian PMCs (Kommersant.ru, March 27, 2018; see EDM, April 19) suggests that these forces may be directly interested in employing Wagner (and similar entities) for specific economic and political objectives in existing regional conflicts. The Russian Federation maintains a long tradition of sending “tourists” to emerging conflicts and then using “nas tam net” (“we are not there”) rhetoric to deny participation—which dates back to Soviet involvement (or claimed “non-involvement”) in conflicts in the Middle East in the 1970s. Under current circumstances, the combination of deniability, fear of massive losses in manpower (informed by the war in Afghanistan and later by the first Chechen conflict, which both resulted in growing public discontent with the ruling elites) as well as economic interests (leading to the top of the power vertical and apparently the siloviki) makes it highly unlikely that Moscow will allow for the legalization of PMCs—at least until the civil war in Syria comes to an end.

It is worth emphasizing that the prospect of being killed in a regional conflict does not appear to discourage those Russians ready to join PMCs. Indeed, as of March, the number of Wagner forces reportedly reached 4,840 people (Lenta.ru, March 13, 2018)—a visible increase over previous periods. Decent wages and a relatively generous (by Russian standards) compensation package (Chvk.info, accessed April 14) make for a powerful stimulus likely to keep the stream of volunteers flowing.