Trump' borderline failure of strategy

Trump threatened to bomb Iran. But under the considering invasion of the Iranian space by two aircrafts, one Drone and one tripulated.

Iranian anti-aircraft battalion crashed down the drone and left the tripulated plane to leave the Iranian Space. But with the invasion and the shot down the Drone was legal under international law and martial laws.

But the minded down Neocon ideology inside Trump's dome is to use every single action, even legal, to invade countries and to position themselves strategically in globe.

Analysing the action and the threateninf of Trump, the position of him is about to impose that USA have the natural right of invade everyones' space without any problem and the other nations must swallow this position of USA, wanting or not.

Strange that, days after, Trump want to talk to Iran and have a possible dialog.

But anyway, the idea of invasion is against the unity theoretics of international anarchy, and is an imposition of hegemony of one nation, unipolar world, promoted by a west influence over global society, civil or military, surpassing the powers of other decisors.

The project of this only USA hegemony and a globalist-americanism military superpower as the only superpower was described by Bolton's Project for a New American Century and supported by Neocon, and Trump's dome, with the excuse of a global security guaranteed by USA.

According to the Manifesto:
Either alternative seemed to us shortsighted. The United States is the world’s only superpower, combining preeminent military power, global technological leadership, and the world’s largest economy. Moreover, America stands at the head of a system of alliances which includes the world’s other leading democratic powers. At present the United States faces no global rival. America’s grand strategy should aim to preserve and extend this advantageous position as far into the future as possible. There are, however, potentially powerful states dissatisfied with the current situation and eager to change it, if they can, in directions that endanger the relatively peaceful, prosperous and free condition the world enjoys today. Up to now, they have been deterred from doing so by the capability and global presence of American military power. But, as thatpower declines, relatively and absolutely, the happy conditions that follow from it will be inevitably undermined.
A retreat from any one of these requirements would call America’s status as the world’s leading power into question. As we have seen, even a small failure like that in Somalia or a halting and incomplete triumph as in the Balkans can cast doubt on American credibility. The failure to define a coherent global security and military strategy during the post-Cold-War period has invited challenges; states seeking to establish regional hegemony continue to probe for the limits of the American security perimeter. None of the defense reviews of the past decade has weighed fully the range of missions demanded by U.S. global leadership: defending the homeland fighting and winning multiple large-scale wars, conducting constabulary missions which preserve the current peace, and transforming the U.S. armed forces to exploit the “revolution in military affairs.” Nor have they adequately quantified the forces and resources necessary to execute these missions separately and successfully. While much further detailed analysis would be required, it is the purpose of this study to outline the large, “fullspectrum” forces that are necessary to conduct the varied tasks demanded by a strategy of American preeminence for today and tomorrow.
According to the text, the idea is to promote a perpetual peace under military capability, leaded by USA and with the leadership over the alies, also, with economic and military subjulgation on their enemies, also, justifying a global strategic military position.

So, USA is all the time in an economic warfare and trying to intimidate the non-lined countries with expectations to promote a possible oposition to the governments and line the politics at his own way.

This strategy showed how fail is the Trump's politics, and it happens to all new right in countries that are lined to USA's politics. There is a failure in communication and shows how the deterrance is used, and bad, in the change in the diplomatic relations between the countries. Trump's politics about to threatening of economic deterrent, imtimidation and hire of use NATO to promote geographic positiions.




Bolton Warns Iran Not to ‘Mistake U.S. Prudence and Discretion for Weakness’
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/world/middleeast/john-bolton-iran-drone.html

By David M. Halbfinger
June 23, 2019

JERUSALEM — President Trump’s national security adviser, John R. Bolton, warned Tehran on Sunday not to “mistake U.S. prudence and discretion for weakness,” saying that military action against Iran remained very much an option even though the United States last week called off one military strike.

Trump was right not to bomb Iran. Now he needs a strategy.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-was-right-not-to-bomb-iran-now-he-needs-a-strategy/2019/06/21/8086ed62-9438-11e9-b58a-a6a9afaa0e3e_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.db2fab05adfe

IT MAY have made the United States look wobbly, but President Trump was right to hold back at the last minute from launching a military strike against Iran — and not only because, as the president later tweeted, 150 Iranians might have been killed. The proposed airstrikes in response to the shooting down of a U.S. drone would have dangerously escalated a confrontation with Tehran that Mr. Trump has pursued without a coherent goal, and thus without any prospect of a successful outcome.

Iran is almost certainly responsible for a series of provocative acts around the Persian Gulf in recent weeks, including the mining of ships, as well as the drone shoot-down. But Mr. Trump made this carefully calibrated offensive nearly inevitable when he escalated sanctions against the Islamic republic in April. U.S. pressure on the European Union, China and other reluctant countries has all but shut down Iranian exports of oil and other commodities.

While threatening the regime of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with economic catastrophe, Mr. Trump has offered it no exit ramp. The president says he wants negotiations, but Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has laid out a dozen U.S. demands calling not just for stricter controls on Iran’s nuclear program — the goal cited by Mr. Trump — but also the complete reversal of Iranian foreign policy. Mr. Pompeo has candidly acknowledged that the Khamenei regime will never agree to those demands; instead, he suggested that “the people can change the government.”

In fact, however desirable regime change in Tehran might be, sanctions won’t bring it about. Achieving Mr. Pompeo’s goals would require war, and war is what the administration’s actions were leading to until Mr. Trump stepped back on Thursday. No doubt the president has in mind his many promises not to involve the United States in more Middle Eastern quagmires. But a war with Iran would be particularly self-defeating. Until Mr. Trump began his “maximum pressure” campaign, the Islamic republic posed no imminent threat to the United States; according to U.N. inspectors, its nuclear program was contained.

Limited airstrikes of the sort Mr. Trump was considering would not stop Iranian aggression, much less bring about regime change. Most likely, they would prompt another escalation by Iran, which has the capacity to kill Americans across the Middle East. A full-scale war with the well-armed nation of 80 million would be folly — and ought to be unthinkable.

Unfortunately, at least until Thursday, Mr. Trump appeared to have done very little thinking about where his Iran policy might lead him. He ought now to order a reset. The first step is to set realistic goals: Iran might be induced to reimpose and perhaps tighten controls on its nuclear program, but it is not going to entirely abandon its regional ambitions. The United States should not be pursuing Iran’s capitulation on behalf of Saudi Arabia and Israel. Instead, it should reforge the coalition with European partners that succeeded in constraining Iran’s nuclear activities and reopen channels of communication with Tehran.

Donald Trump's plan to bomb Iran shows strategy gap
By Rodger Shanahan
Posted Sun at 10:55pm

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-06-24/donald-trumps-plan-to-bomb-iran-shows-strategy-gap/11240136

When US President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) he derided the agreement, saying "It didn't bring calm, it didn't bring peace and it never will".

A year later, we have seen attacks against four oil tankers in the Persian Gulf in May, another two this month and last week the downing of a $100 million US drone by an Iranian missile in the same area.

A Saudi oil pipeline has been attacked along with several civilian airports, and short-range rockets have been fired into facilities in Iraq that host US personnel.

The White House also claimed that Mr Trump was close to authorising strikes against Iranian military targets in response to the downing of the American unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

It is fair to say then, that Washington's unilateral withdrawal from an agreement with which Tehran was complying has brought neither the calm nor the peacefulness that Mr Trump claimed was missing.

What is the US strategy?
The problem with Mr Trump's slogan of 'maximum pressure' is that it appears to be a series of tactics not supporting any coherent strategic outcome.
The obvious question is where to from here?

The Iranian leadership has been quite unequivocal in refusing to renegotiate the JCPOA and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei made it pretty clear during his meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan that he didn't believe Mr Trump was serious in his willingness to talk.

It has incrementally calibrated its responses to US moves from the targeting of empty vessels in May to attacking laden vessels above the waterline in June, then the downing of the UAV the same month.

It has also tried to place pressure on the Europeans by threatening to stop complying with certain aspects of the JCPOA after July 7 unless the European signatories were able to come up with a financial mechanism that would allow Tehran to continue to trade with European firms without those companies becoming subject to US sanctions.

It isn't certain whether Iran breaching some of the conditions of the JCPOA would automatically render the agreement itself invalid.

Tehran could argue that the agreement allows them to cease adhering to some of the JCPOA's provisions if the US re-imposed sanctions, or that the imposition of those unilateral sanctions was the very reason why it was unable to sell its low-enriched uranium and were therefore technically in breach.

Giving inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued access could provide incentives for other signatories to continuing to engage with Iran.

Does Iran have a plan?
In the medium term, Tehran would be eyeing the US presidential election campaign and has likely concluded that a Democrat win at the end of next year is their best chance to gain relief from the US sanctions.
In the event Mr Trump was to win a second term however, they would have to re-evaluate their approach but they would factor in a new administration, with the likely absence of an ultra-hawkish John Bolton.

To further complicate the issue, there is also the possibility that in 18 months' time there may be a new Supreme Leader at the helm in Tehran, given (admittedly long-standing) reports about his ill health.

But 18 months is a long time in politics and much could happen, particularly as the US administration appears to lack a coherent Iran strategy.

They claim they are not seeking regime change at the same time as the President appointed John Bolton, a noted Iran hawk who has accepted tens of thousands of dollars to speak at conferences organised by Mujahideen-e-Khalq, a group that calls for the overthrow of the Iranian regime and was until a few years ago a proscribed terrorist organisation.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo last year issued a set of 12 demands for Iran to comply with if it wanted to avoid renewed unilateral sanctions, while on Friday Mr Trump said that he was willing to talk with Iran with no preconditions.

Iran believes that it stills retains the diplomatic advantage and is likely to continue with its policy of trying to incrementally respond to US pressure with non-attributable or potentially deniable actions.

Second-guessing Trump is risky
Their calculation is that Mr Trump lacks broad support from his traditional allies and has been so critical of US military commitments in the Middle East for so long that he is loathe to enter another conflict unless a threshold is reached.
The problem for Tehran though, is that no-one is quite sure what that threshold is, or how firm his commitment to avoid another regional conflict is.

Given the personality traits that Mr Trump has exhibited to date, Iran continuing to base their actions on what they believe Mr Trump will tolerate is a policy fraught with danger.

When he announced his withdrawal from the JCPOA, Mr Trump exhibited a good understanding of the likely response from Tehran to his action: "Iran's leaders will naturally say that they refuse to negotiate a new deal; they refuse. And that's fine. I'd probably say the same thing if I was in their position," he said.

Unfortunately for Washington, after more than a year of "maximum pressure", Tehran is still saying the same thing.

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