Irregular Warfare, Hybrid Threats, and the Future Role of Ground Forces

• Traditional threats are posed by states using recognized military capabilities and forces in comprehended forms of military campaign and conflict.
• Irregular threats are posed by an adversary employing unconventional, asymmetric methods and means to counter traditional U.S. advantages. These methods and means can include such means of irregular warfare as terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla war-fare, and can accompany economic, political, informational and cultural means as well.
• Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession and use of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons – weapons of mass destruction (WMA).
• Disruptive threats involve an enemy using or developing new, breakthrough technolo-gies to reduce U.S. advantages.

In war, a state actor will generally match available means—defined by a portion of gross domestic product matched to technological capability—to projected political end-states—contingency requirements planned against potential adversaries in a multitude of contexts. As a result, the typical military organization will be optimized for a broad range of potential scenarios based on likely political temperament. In a large, resource rich country such as the U.S., China, or Russia, this results in a broad force which is prepared for offense, defense, and stability type operations across a varying scale. In reality, this “optimized” force is not prepared for a specific employment context, but rather optimizes to best meet a broad array of scenarios for employment—resulting in less optimization for a unique context. (McCulloh: Theory of Hybrid Conflict. p. 15) 

However, not all military organizations develop or are employed in this manner. Nations constrained by a lack of resources or technological capability must make decisions as to the breadth and depth of their “optimization.” This practice can then lead to a number of variations in military organization from broad, flat armies of primarily light infantry designed for specific functions such as population control and internal regime survival, to small or medium sized forces with combined arms depth to confront specific external threats such as tanks, missiles, and aircraft. Generally, these less resourced organizations will conform to a conventional model of a large, full-spectrum military on a smaller scale as in the example of the 1973 era Egyptian Army based on a Soviet-type organizational model. (McCulloh: Theory of Hybrid Conflict. p. 15)