Theoric Discussion about the use of Private Military Contractors pt. 2

Na minha visão há um entrosamento da ideologia realista, neorrealista e neoliberal, devido a guerra estar com uma participação menor do Estado, e cada vez menor, apenas para manter um símbolo legal ou legítimo e diplomático, porque a Guerra Contra o Terror, mesmo os conflitos na África, tiveram como principais agentes no combate direto, empreiteiras militares, mercenários, cães de guerra, soldados da fortuna, serviços terceirizados que atuaram dentro do campo de batalha. Além disso, a Revolução nos Assuntos Militares trata a tecnologia e a guerra irregular como uma modalidade além da capacidade do Estado de prover a Guerra. A guerrilha maoista, grupos terroristas em rede, agentes não estatais, são os principais agentes de desestabilização de um estado, e estes mesmos grupos terceirizam suas atividades, contratando grupos regionais, pequenas empresas que oferecem serviços de assassinato, terrorismo e combate direto. 

Após a Guerra Fria este contexto, junto com as novas modalidades de guerra regionais surgindo, desemprego de ex membros de forças especiais, livre concorrência de mercado e necessidade de adaptação de novas táticas, fez com que o mercado demandasse uma modalidade de empreendedorismo de profissionais para o trabalho de segurança em regiões, capazes de combater estas novas táticas. David Perry explica o fenômeno da privatização no seu artigo Purchasing Power: Is Defence Privatization a New Form of Military Mobilization?, 2011, da seguinte forma:

Since the end of the Cold War, the private sector has become increasingly important in the defence and security realm. Although private actors have long engaged in conflict, the postCold War era has witnessed two fundamental changes in the nature of private involvement in conflict. First, private participation in war has been corporatized. While in the modern era mercenaries were mostly unaffiliated, loosely coordinated groups of individuals, today, large, well organized firms provide a vast array of services intricately linked to all aspects of warfare. As a result, these Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are far more important military actors than mercenaries ever were. Second, these firms now work on behalf of the most powerful states in the international system. Whereas in the modern era mercenaries were largely employed by developing world governments, most Western states now have contracts with PMSCs.

Mesmo diante de um conflito, o sistema legal não tem como dar conta sem que atue fora do eixo legal do conflito, portanto há terceirização de setores, terceirização do setor de inteligência, serviços gerais, recursos humanos, treinamento de pessoal e atualmente até mesmo o combate direto.

A guerra na sua modalidade clássica perde o espaço para uma guerra entre exércitos regulares e irregulares, a tecnologia e robótica atuam em uma corrida por tecnologia, empresas privadas que trabalham sua gestão voltada para prover esta tecnologia para a guerra e a probabilidade de uma gerra total, propaganda, mídia, o ambiente não convencional e híbrido se torna hostil para o Estado envolvido diretamente no conflito.

A mídia é um fator negativo para a promoção do conflito, os esquerdistas também se tornam um fator negativo para o mantimento da ordem, ideologias libertárias acabam promovendo o conflito do lado oposto, assim como a guerra total nunca seria aceita por ambos os lados, e a falta de pessoal e pagamento faz com que empreiteiras militares e companhias terceirizadas trabalhem este aspecto, tirando o centro de gravidade do Estado para agentes civis, guerrilha, tecnologia e principalmente a política e opinião publica passam a ser a alavanca para o conflito e o sucesso na guerra, devendo promover a segurança e bem estar interno e comprovar real necessidade de promoção do conflito direto, e burlar leis internacionais.

Neste cenário trabalhar junto a esferas civis, buscar auxílio em forças contra o governo legítimo, mercenários, empreiteiras para terceirizar seus serviços, todos atuam juntamente para o sucesso da missão. No cenário então deve-se levar tudo em conta, a minoria a favor e contra e a maioria neutra e possivelmente contra o conflito. Não sendo um cenário novo, Skorzeny mesmo utilizou uniformes de seus inimigos para travar uma guerrilha dentro de uma guerra de escala mundial. Na Operação Enduring Freedom as forças especiais dos EUA se aliaram com a Aliança do Norte para combater o governo Talibã, assim com a milicia local e infiltração em território inimigo, foi possível o sucesso da missão.

Desta forma a anarquia no conflito, alianças e o valor do capital pela terceirização dentro do conflito fazem com que o conflito saia do centro de gravidade, atuando em diversas camadas ao mesmo tempo.

Alguns pontos importantes para serem tratados abaixo:

O realismo político, segundo a Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Moseley:

Political realism in essence reduces to the political-ethical principle that might is right. The theory has a long history, being evident in Thucydides' Pelopennesian War. It was expanded on by Machiavelli in The Prince, and others such as Thomas Hobbes, Spinoza, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau followed (the theory was given great dramatical portrayed in Shakespeare's Richard III). In the late nineteenth century it underwent a new incarnation in the form of social darwinism, whose adherents explained social and hence political growth in terms of a struggle in which only the fittest (strongest) cultures or polities would survive. Political realism assumes that interests are to be maintained through the exercise of power, and that the world is characterised by competing power bases. In international politics, most political theorists emphasise the nation state as the relevant agent, whereas Marxists focus on classes. 

(...) 

Descriptive political realism commonly holds that the international community is characterized by anarchy, since there is no overriding world government that enforces a common code of rules. Whilst this anarchy need not be chaotic, for various member states of the international community may engage in treaties or in trading patterns that generate an order of sorts, most theorists conclude that law or morality does not apply beyond the nation's boundaries. Arguably political realism supports Hobbes's view of the state of nature, namely that the relations between self-seeking political entities are necessarily a-moral. Hobbes asserts that without a presiding government to legislate codes of conduct, no morality or justice can exist: "Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice¼ if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men." (Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Ch.13 'Of Man', and Part II, Ch.17, 'Of Commonwealth') Accordingly, without a supreme international power or tribunal, states view each other with fear and hostility, and conflict, or the threat thereof, is endemic to the system.  

Another proposition is that a nation can only advance its interests against the interests of other nations; this implies that the international environment is inherently unstable. Whatever order may exists breaks down when nations compete for the same resources, for example, and war may follow. In such an environment, the realists argue, a nation has only itself to depend on. 

Political realists are often characterised as a-moralists, that any means should be used to uphold the national interest, but a poignant criticism is that the definition of morality is being twisted to assume that acting in one's own or one's nation's interests is immoral or amoral at best. This is an unfair claim against serving one's national interest, just as claiming that any self-serving action is necessarily immoral on the personal level. The discussion invokes the ethics of impartiality; those who believe in a universal code of ethics argue that a self-serving action that cannot be universalized is immoral. However, universalism is not the only standard of ethical actions.

Link para a descrição: http://www.iep.utm.edu/polreal/

The main points of neo-liberalism include:

• THE RULE OF THE MARKET. Liberating "free" enterprise or private enterprise from any bonds imposed by the government (the state) no matter how much social damage this causes. Greater openness to international trade and investment, as in NAFTA. Reduce wages by de-unionizing workers and eliminating workers' rights that had been won over many years of struggle. No more price controls. All in all, total freedom of movement for capital, goods and services. To convince us this is good for us, they say "an unregulated market is the best way to increase economic growth, which will ultimately benefit everyone." It's like Reagan's "supply-side" and "trickle-down" economics -- but somehow the wealth didn't trickle down very much.

• CUTTING PUBLIC EXPENDITURE FOR SOCIAL SERVICES like education and health care. REDUCING THE SAFETY-NET FOR THE POOR, and even maintenance of roads, bridges, water supply -- again in the name of reducing government's role. Of course, they don't oppose government subsidies and tax benefits for business.

• DEREGULATION. Reduce government regulation of everything that could diminsh profits, including protecting the environmentand safety on the job.

• PRIVATIZATION. Sell state-owned enterprises, goods and services to private investors. This includes banks, key industries, railroads, toll highways, electricity, schools, hospitals and even fresh water. Although usually done in the name of greater efficiency, which is often needed, privatization has mainly had the effect of concentrating wealth even more in a few hands and making the public pay even more for its needs.

• ELIMINATING THE CONCEPT OF "THE PUBLIC GOOD" or "COMMUNITY" and replacing it with "individual responsibility." Pressuring the poorest people in a society to find solutions to their lack of health care, education and social security all by themselves -- then blaming them, if they fail, as "lazy."

Complete article at: http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=376

A regra de mercado neste caso trabalhará dentro da concorrência, a livre concorrência de mercado, trabalhando a necessidade de corrida por tecnologia, robótica, geração de emprego, oferta de mão-de-obra. Assim o Estado gasta o mínimo com os gastos básicos para a guerra, armamento, tecnologia, inteligência, recursos humanos, terceirizando para empresas com capacidade de prover esta demanda. O advento da tecnologia necessária para a guerra e a mão-de-obra passa a ser sobre contrato, assim reduzindo os gastos do Estado, e de certa forma fazendo o capital girar na sociedade através do mercado, tendo o Estado participação mínima diante de suas obrigações.

A guerra de contratos passa a ser uma modalidade usada, já que apenas as forças regulares servem para mídia e diplomacia, sendo a logística, inteligência, recursos e combate irregular, assuntos tratados por civis, ex-combatentes e contratados empregados para tal fim.

Segundo Cordesman, a RAM:

The nonstate actors that shape most such conflicts do attack the full range of national security forces; rather, they attack the weaknesses in local governments and the fault lines in their societies. They not only “swim” among the population, to use Mao Tse-tung’s terminology on guerilla warfare, they use that same population as weapons and as the equivalent of human shields. They counter high-technology strike capabilities with people, propaganda, and by exploiting the civil casualties and collateral damage that high-technology weapons create. They use insurgency and political influence as additional weapons and tactics, and they fight as much on the civil level as they do using weapons and terrorism.

(...) 

The real revolution in military affairs is forcing modern states to use the advancements in military technology to focus on minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage rather than destroying the enemy. In some cases, it makes laws of war designed for totally different types of combat a political and propaganda weapon in the hands of nonstate actors and nations that use asymmetric means of combat.  

(...) 

The propaganda and strategic communications aspects of the fighting become equally important. Tactical victories becomes meaningless without civil victory, and military forces alone cannot defeat the enemy. The measure of success ceases to be which side wins a given series of battles; instead, success is measured by which side has influence and control over the population.Time and resilience become weapons, as well. There are usually no quick ways to deal with a nation’s internal economic and social problems and the failures of its political system and governance. Experience shows that long, low-level wars tend to favor the nonstate actor or simply the most persistent side. The human and political dimension in wars of attrition become the real center of gravity.

Link para o artigo: http://csis.org/publication/real-revolution-military-affairs

Ettinger (Neoliberalism and the Rise of the Private Military Industry - 2011) trata do assunto e justifica o mercenarismo dentro do neoliberalismo da seguinte forma:

The for-profit logic of private military firms is quite unlike old conceptions of ‘mercenaries.’ Today, private military firms are integrated into the operations of the world’s most powerful militaries and normalized through their transaction on the free market. The market for private military services is enormous and the extent to which the US military has been privatized is so profound that the viability of US foreign engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan are contingent upon the availability of contracted labour. (pg. 2)

Military privatization is a single iteration of a broader phenomenon—the conditioning of the modern state by the neoliberal market framework that informs globalization in the twenty-first century. The literature on this topic is vast and its conceptualization of ‘neoliberalism’ itself has been equally diverse. But the treatment of neoliberalism has often presented in a simplified or caricaturized form, a fact that has yielded much debate and frustration with the term. (Cerny 2008; Watkins 2010) Indeed, thoughtful attempts have been made to articulate the essence of economic neoliberalism and its effects on advanced capitalist states in the twenty-first century. (Jessop 2002; Harvey 2005; Turner 2008) but the dynamic character of the phenomenon has proven difficult to capture. Therefore neoliberalism must be understood and analyzed as a dynamic and evolving process, contingent upon temporal and spatial context. Accordingly, speaking of ‘neoliberalism’ necessarily refers to the process of neoliberalization; an ongoing account of a phenomenon that develops unevenly and with varying effects, in this case contributing to the transformation of the fundamental properties of the modern state. (pg. 3)

(...)  

While mercenarism is not new, the corporatized military firm is a new actor in world politics that turns conventional understanding of state authority and the legitimate use of force on its head. Rather than viewing the state as the sole repository of legitimate force, private military firms have fixed themselves into positions as legitimate market actors, dispensing force in the name of profit. These are profound developments and represent a challenge to conventionally held perspectives on the state and International Relations. (IR) For all of its emphasis on the state, IR literature inadequately theorizes its primary unit of analysis and has long been criticized for its inattention. (Walker 1995) It is within the broad paradigm of International Political Economy (IPE) that scholars have developed more sophisticated theoretical inquiries into the changing nature of the state. (pg. 4)

The neoliberal synthesis is managed such that it allows for the primacy of market freedom, while strategically allowing formal and informal governance mechanisms to take the place of Keynesian restrictions. Thus, scholars have adapted the language of Keynesian embedded liberalism and have begun speaking of ‘embedded neoliberalism’ to capture the policies, programs, and crucially, the normalization of its practices. (pg. 4)

In the US, both phases of neoliberalism entail the normalization of marketizing the state’s legitimate use of coercive force. With the privatized ‘coalition of the billing’ in tow fighting alongside state forces, the military-commercial complex in the US has blurred distinctions between state and market, public good and private gain, foreign policy and corporate profit. The US remains capable of presenting a politically viable war policy to its domestic audiences by claiming that uniformed troop levels will be kept low thus avoiding 5 Vietnam-era domestic strife. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the initial ‘roll back’ phase of military privatization created a boom industry in the midst of a war zone. (pg. 4)

(...) 

In the US, the privatization of military functions and the market constraints on US force projection represents an incursion of the logic of capitalism into the logic of security policy, a development that is obscured by state-centric theories of International Relations. (pg. 11) 

David Perry, explica a questão pela Revolução nos Assuntos Militares, com a tecnologia sofisticando as forças especiais, porém há um gap na explicação de como esta modalidade de empreiteiras privadas passa a fazer parte da manobra principal do combate, já que a privatização passa a exceder os serviços governamentais:

The first situates defense privatization as part of the changing nature of warfare. The increasing technological complexity of military equipment via the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), particularly with respect to the use of information technology, has made military equipment increasingly complex. As a result, rather than attempting to develop and retain the expertise needed to maintain military equipment, governments have instead turned the maintenance of high-tech platforms over to the civilian industry that manufactures it. Thus, privatization has been driven, in part, by the increasingly technical nature of military forces. A second explanation for the rise of PMSCs points to the privatization revolution which swept the West in the 1980’s. This revolution had a number of constituent parts, including: the spread of neoliberal ideology in the 1980s which privileged the private sector over the public; the outsourcing boom in the private sector; and a general view that publicly provide services were inherently inferior to the market.

The RMA explanation, for instance, does a good job of explaining the privatization of technologically sophisticated forces, but cannot explain why the most widely privatized services are the least technically sophisticated, namely logistics. The utility of the privatization revolution explanation is limited for several reasons. First, there is significant variation in the extent of privatization even between countries that were comparably influenced by neoliberalism like the United States and Great Britain. Second, privatization in the defence realm has exceeded the privatization of other government services within the same countries.  

No meu  entendimento, o que explica essa junção de tecnologia com forças especiais e privatização é no ponto em que a política e o Estado não conseguem produzir por si só suas demandas, mesmo que haja um comando militar por detrás do projeto, é necessário o auxílio de mão de obra especializada de universidades, setores civis específicos e a própria concorrência de mercado que limita o Estado a adquirir essa mão de obra sem uma "concorrência perfeita" e isonomia (licitações). No final o próprio Estado paga pelas suas leis reguladoras quando ao livre mercado.

Além disso, o Estado por si só não consegue produzir economia. Mesmo num estado Keynesiano, em que há intervenção para a regulamentação de suas finanças, o Estado não produz sua própria fonte de renda, sem que hajam agentes privados trabalhando para seus sustentos, consumindo, gerando impostos e recebendo por sua produção. Há apenas a possibilidade de limitar esta capacidade de consumo, porém não existe um Estado que se provém por si só, mas a senhoriagem é uma estratégia que já se mostrou falha por diversas vezes na história.