¿¿NiKarágua, El Salvador, Bolívia, Ekuador, Venezuela, Kuba?? ¡¡Tu culo!!!
I would like to know what is the great amazingly representation these countries have to make too much noise on the Dilma's government have lost the legitimacy and legality? We are talking about socialist countries with lowest economies in Latin America, manipulated by the Foro de São Paulo, that gave their government legitimacy when they armed the drug traffic and organized crime against the right governments.
Well, here in Brazil we can hear a little noise, but all the noise listened are comming from left parties, not from the population's soul. It's divided by minorities and with private causes to implicate against the legitimacy, but it's not common to see the second day of a government have too many movements against... only few people around, financed by PT and wanting to make it unlegitimated. Funny how communists work...
It's subestimation of the capability of someone like me.
We are talking about people with a irregular army, ilegal methods of financiate the state system economy. We are talking that the biggest criminal organization were financed and formed by PT militancy. The illegitimate militia of Chavez were financed by the Communist party in Venezuela, in model of the Foro de São Paulo, as the same of Nicarágua and Bolivia militants, and Brazil of MST movement.
We are talking about armed groups behind the pacific leftist movements.
The same ilegitimacy that Dilma got here, Maduro is getting in Venezuela, and the same poor discourse of a coup d'etat running is done there. The Maduro is saying about ilegality in not reconize his government and in a plebicite will be decided if he stays or goes, but he is also creating a mecanism of cancel this public decision, like Dilma did. It didn't work here, but there, the civil war has already began, when Chavez was still alive, the militia attacked and opened fire against the students that were requesting direct elections.
Well, this kind of propaganda in Latin America sounds fun, when we see these countries requesting their embassies to return because they don't reconize new government. If wasn't for Brazil they couldn't at least survive in Latin America, because they represents less than nothing to the international scenario!
Coup d'etat my ass!
Check the perversity of Che Guevara's dictatorship. In Brazil the only model of PT government was associate and distort the wellfare state model and institutionalize the corruption. Model followed by all the other countries in Bolivarian style, with the help of Foro de São Paulo, using local militias and drug traffic. It's the KGB model to destabilizate the running govermnent, using ilegal methods.
Also create a imagery of heroes from the past, but it's more racial division, and the category of divide and conquer model. Communist does it well, dividing in minorities and make them fight themselves for some legitimacy and representation, the strategy of divide and conquer.
That answers why there is a lot of leftist parties in South America and almost no more right parties. But it's a fake nationalism. For exemple, Simon Bolivar was a white military from Europe, that was fighting for the freedom of citizens in South America, but the bolivarian model is fighting for pre-european colonization tribes and their pride of being. It's contradictory, they cannot unify the whole country, the whole unity, and the lack of education they give to the society justifies the great numbers of militia and guerrilla warfare groups.
In Brazil the Guerrilla Warfare is urban, financed by government.
The Cuban Guerrilla was successfull because (the words of Guevara):
- Popular forces can win a war against the army.
- It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can create them.
- In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.
(Guevara - Guerrilla Warfare)
Of these three propositions the first two contradict the defeatist attitude of revolutionaries or pseudo-revolutionaries who remain inactive and take refuge in the pretext that against a professional army nothing can be done, who sit down to wait until in some mechanical way all necessary objective and subjective conditions are given without working to accelerate them. As these problems were formerly a subject of discussion in Cuba, until facts settled the question, they are probably still much discussed in America. Naturally, it is not to be thought that all conditions for revolution are going to be created through the impulse given to them by guerrilla activity. It must always be kept in mind that there is a necessary minimum without which the establishment and consolidation of the first center is not practicable. People must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil debate. When the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power against established law; peace is considered already broken. In these conditions popular discontent expresses itself in more active forms. An attitude of resistance finally crystallizes in an outbreak of fighting, provoked initially by the conduct of the authorities. Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted. The third proposition is a fundamental of strategy. It ought to be noted by those who maintain dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the immense participation of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America. Of course the struggles of the city masses of organized workers should not be underrated; but their real possibilities of engaging in armed struggle must be carefully analyzed where the guarantees which customarily adorn our constitutions are suspended or ignored. In these conditions the illegal workers' movements face enormous dangers. They must function secretly without arms. The situation in the open country is not so difficult. There, in places beyond the reach of the repressive forces, the armed guerrillas can support the inhabitants. We will later make a careful analysis of these three conclusions that stand out in the Cuban revolutionary experience. We emphasize them now at the beginning of this work as our fundamental contribution. Guerrilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has diverse characteristics, different facets, even though the essential will for liberation remains the same. It is obvious -and writers on the theme have said it many times-that war responds to a certain series of scientific laws; whoever ignores them will go down to defeat. Guerrilla warfare as a phase of war must be ruled by all of these; but besides, because of its special aspects, a series of corollary laws must also be recognized in order to carry it forward. Though geographical and social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular forms that guerrilla warfare will take, there are general laws that hold for all fighting of this type. Our task at the moment is to find the basic principles of this kind of fighting and the rules to be followed by peoples seeking liberation; to develop theory from facts; to generalize and give structure to our experience for the profit of others. Let us first consider the question: who are the combatants in guerrilla warfare? On one side we have a group composed of the oppressor and his agents, the professional army, well armed and disciplined, in many cases receiving foreign help as well as the help of the bureaucracy in the employ of the oppressor. On the other side are the people of the nation or region involved. It is important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force from the mass of the people themselves. The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in firepower. Guerrilla warfare is used by the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression. The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition. This is clearly seen by considering the case of bandit gangs that operate in a region. They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army, homogeneity, respect for the leader, valor, knowledge of the ground, and, often, even good understanding of the tactics to be employed. The only thing missing is support of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs are captured and exterminated by the public force.(Guevara - Guerrilla Warfare)
Guerrilla tactics are based in sabotage, destablize the society than the government. Together them, the Gramscist model of propaganda, lower parties, and not armored conflicts are used. In Brazil the model used is that, the parties are using the Guerrillas to mantain the order in some places and control the biggest economic centers, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and capitals, with CV and PCC, the rest of the gang are in the senate and congress.
The media focus is in the propaganda:
The revolutionary idea should be diffused by means of appropriate media to the greatest depth possible. This requires complete equipment and an organization. This organization should be of two types which complement each other in covering the whole national area: for propaganda originating outside free territory, that is, from the national civil organization; and propaganda originating within, that is, from the base of the guerrilla army. In order to coordinate these two propagandas, the functions of which are strictly related, there should be a single director for the whole effort. Propaganda of the national type from civil organizations outside free territory should be distributed in newspapers, bulletins, and proclamations. The most important newspapers will be devoted to general matters in the country and will inform the public exactly of the state of the guerrilla forces, observing always the fundamental principle that truth in the long run is the best policy. Besides these publications of general interest there must be others more specialized for different sectors of the population. A publication for the countryside should bring to the peasant class a message from their companions in all the free zones who have already felt the beneficial effects of the revolution; this strengthens the aspirations of the peasantry. A workers' newspaper will have similar characteristics, with the sole difference that it cannot always offer a message from the combatant part of that class, since it is likely that workers' organizations will not operate within the framework of guerrilla warfare until the last stages. The great watchwords of the revolutionary movement, the watchword of a general strike at an opportune moment, of help to the rebel forces, of unity, etc., should be explained. Other periodicals can be published; for example, one explaining the tasks of those elements in the whole island which are not combatants but which nevertheless carry out diverse acts of sabotage, of attempts, etc. Within the organization there can be periodicals aimed at the enemy's soldiers; these will explain facts of which they are otherwise kept ignorant. News bulletins and proclamations about the movement are very useful. The most effective propaganda is that which is prepared within the guerrilla zone. Priority will be given to the diffusion of ideas among natives of the zone, offering explanations of the theoretical significance of the insurrection, already known to them as a fact. In this zone there will also be peasant periodicals, the general organ of all the guerrilla forces, and bulletins and proclamations. There will also be the radio. All problems should be discussed by radio-for example, the way to defend oneself from air attacks and location of the enemy forces, citing familiar names among them. Propaganda for the whole nation will use newspapers of the same type as those prepared outside free territory, but it can produce fresher and more exact news, reporting facts and battles that are extremely interesting to the reader. Information on international affairs will be confined almost exclusively to commentary on facts that are directly related to the struggle of liberation. The propaganda that will be the most effective in spite of everything, that which will spread most freely over the whole national area to reach the reason and the sentiments of the people, is words over the radio. The radio is a factor of extraordinary importance. At moments when war fever is more or less palpitating in every one in a region or a country, the inspiring, burning word increases this fever and communicates it to every one of the future combatants. It explains, teaches, fires, and fixes the future positions of both friends and enemies. However, the radio should be ruled by the fundamental principle of popular propaganda, which is truth; it is preferable to tell the truth, small in its dimensions, than a large lie artfully embellished. On the radio news should be given, especially of battles, of encounters of all types, and assassinations committed by the repression; also, doctrinal orientations and practical lessons to the civil population; and, from time to time, speeches by the chiefs of the revolution. We consider it useful that the principal newspaper of the movement bear a name that recalls something great and unifying, perhaps a national hero or something similar. Also, it should explain in articles of depth where the armed movement is going. It ought to create a consciousness of the great national problems, besides offering sections of more lively interest for the reader.
(Guevara - Guerrilla Warfare)
Now, the model is completely explained, divide the population, put the parties to legitimate the minorities, and make them make noise. Don't let the governor speak first, than show that the number is higher than they count.
First of all, the only countries that are against new government are the bolivarian ones, the worst to be honest, economicaly and socialy broken.
Second, in the society, all people involved in political reform, and it's 100%, are against the corruption, not pro anything or anyone, but less people, less than 20%, are against the new government directly, but 100% are not pro anyone, but against the problem itself.
Media shows something really disturbed of the reality, and the low capability of brazilians to think makes the problems look bigger.
These less than 20% are financed by pre government. And government, from Foro de São Paulo, are requesting foreign help to their friends, bolivarian commies, to show that it's internationaly ilegitimate. But even the considered communists Russia (not communist), North Korea (this one doesn't count!) and China (I don't think it is communist), don't have any preference for Dilma, neighter European or North America, showing that the real super power countries are not interested on who is at the government, but how is the government.
These countries opinion are the ones that we can concern, not almost failed states!
Than, communism is already there to provocate a regress on the social model, communists are less intelligent. Check the communist countries and they have lack of historical fundaments, because they hide the real history to make people think there was an enemy before and they solve their problems, Venezuela also prohibited people to read what was between Bolivar and Chaves (how funny but realy scary also!).
Also the repulsion against the new govermnent, a kind of neo imperialist stuff, or pro USA politics. I don't know how the non supporters can be so offended on pro military government, like the speech of Bolsonaro at the congress, but the ex president Dilma was from the guerrilla warfare, and about the media propaganda they put in the matrix, behind that, the ex president Dilma was into armed conflict. This was taken from the Marighela's book, and express about the armed urban guerrilla groups that support the government, behind the curtains, behind the MST movement. Or CUT!
The coordination of urban guerrilla actions, including each armed action, is the principal way of making armed propaganda. These actions, carried out with specific and determined objectives, inevitably become propaganda material for the mass communications system. Bank assaults, ambushes, desertions and diverting of arms, the rescue of prisoners, executions, kidnappings, sabotage, terrorism, and the war of nerves, are all cases in point. Airplanes diverted in flight by revolutionary action, moving ships and trains assaulted and seized by guerrillas, can also be solely for propa- ganda effects.But the urban guerrilla must never fail to install a clandestine press and must be able to turn out mimeographcd copies using alcohol or e\ectric plates and other duplicating apparatus, expropriating what he cannot buy in order to produce small clandestine ne\Vspapers, pamphlets, flyers, and stamps for propaganda and agitation against the dictatorship. The urban guerrilla engaged in clandestine printing facilitates enormously the incorporation of large numbers of people into the revolutionary struggle, by opening a permanent work front for those willing to carry on revolutionary propaganda, even when to do so means acting alone and risking their lives as revolutionaries. With the existence of clandestine propaganda and agitational material. the inventive spirit of the urban guerrilla expands and creates catapults, artifacts, mortars, and other instruments with which to distribute the antigovernment pamphlets at a distance. Tape recordings, the occupation of radio srations, and the use of loudspeakers, drawings on walls and in orher inaccessihle places are other forms of propaganda. In using them, the urban guerrilla should give them the characrer of armed operations. A consistent propaganda by lerters sent to specific addresses, explaining the meaning of the urban guerrillas' armed acrions, produces considerable resulrs and is one merhod of influencing certain segments of rhe population. Even this influence exercised in the heart of the people by ever:,' possible propaganda device revolving around the activity of the urban guerrilla does not indicate that our forces have everyone's support. It it enough ro win the support of a part of the people and this can be done by popularizing the following slogan: "Let he who does not wish to do anything for the revolutionaries, do norhing against them."
(Marighela - Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla)
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