Analysis on Dirty Bombs: Terror's will to destroy

The extensive power for destruction is imediate. Most aggravated is when the State want to occult the search for nuclear devices. Without a clear nuclear program, the amatheur nuclear program can be a problem for the national security of the country, and other means to get the nuclear devices are explored. 

Durign the war on terror, the probability of a nuclear trigger from the terrorist point of view was great, but no one would like to assume the position of seller for Bin Laden of a Warhead. The quantity of material acquired is not clear, but the black market and underground sellers would like to open sources and outsource the market of warfare for mass destruction weapons. This sound an alert to the international security. Even through the sanctions, Pyongyang was able to complete the tests with great capability and warned the world of a possible new war. Hezbollah and Revolutionary Forces of Colombia were able to disrupt the state by opposition and could clearly claim a part of the government or fears the neighboors with the possibility of a great destructive weapon. 

Recently in Brazil, the interception of conversations listened that Brazilian drug traffickers wanted to get ballistic missiles to promote terror and claim their needs to the government. 

The possibility of a non-state actor get successfully access and fabricate nuclear devices or dirty bombs - not only obtain one, but fabricate - is an important ingredient for hybrid actors and irregulars paramilitary armies, private or revolutionary. The chaotic historical proccess after the Cold War and the new warfare strategies, revolution in military affairs, the Maoist Guerrillas and the South American revolutionary armies, mujahedins and other groups started to be actors with decisive papers to the international relations. The Nuclear arsenal of Soviets were outside the Russian borders, specially in Ukraine.

While Ukraine is a adverse of Russia, the ultras comes from the tradition that Ukraine must fit the freedom by the strenght, promoting a non-linear country to the European nor the Western models, and use the deterrance and hybrid competitors to promote the negociation and deterrence.

The logic of the might is mutually assured by the total destruction based in mutual vulnerability. The absolute chaos and total destruction, is based in the unity of international anarchy and international security. But in the case of nonstate actors, the elements of a nuclear arsenal can be an instrument for fear and disruption at the order. Some actors and parties have the core of gravity to their enemies, claiming attacks and promoting attack to strategic and specific places, like plants, hospitals, military and police states, and civilian. The population centers becomes a target, but with a mass destruction device, they can finish the army supposed to fight back. 

The use of mass destruction weapons, including dirty bombs, radium and uranium, bioterrorism, thermobaric or hydrogen bombs can deter the oppositor to a place of acceptance a new level of warfare and order. ISIS was claiming once the ex-Muslim geographical places, and with a capability of deterrence, the State can press the armies to a possible dialogue, in charge of a nonstate, net organization, fight a geographical and physical agent.

The cause and effect of pathological agents in population can spred terror in society and make society a maneuver to a new position, pro or anti the government agency. A terror state can turn the society against the government if it cannot deter the terrorist agent. The imagery of chaos and new risen state put the population in a state of psychological paranoia, constantly molded by a perpetual fear, if it's a terrorist agent or a terrorist government, like socialist states, in general using dirty war tactics against the own population, implementing guerrilla as governmental arms of their military forces and blaming the opposition.

The will of Asymmetric warfare evokes the capability of non state actors, being criminals, terrorists, or irregular armies, being guerrillas or revolutionaries the capability of deterrence through the national armies, and regular actors with long range capability of warfare.

Nuclear Weapons: Terrorism and the Nonstate Actor

https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/nuclear-weapons-terrorism-and-nonstate-actor

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Radiological Dispersal Devices

A radiological dispersal device (RDD), also called a "dirty bomb," is simply a device that disperses radiation. Depending on the motives of those planning the attack, such a device could be a low-key weapon that surreptitiously releases aerosolized radioactive material, dumps out a finely powdered radioactive material or dissolves a radioactive material in water. Such methods would be intended to slowly expose as many people as possible to the radiation. Alternatively, even a low-tech improvised explosive device could hypothetically be used to disperse a radiological isotope (though it may not be the most efficient means — and the explosive itself may be the most lethal part of the entire apparatus). However, unless large amounts of a very strong radioactive material are used, the effects of such an exposure are more likely to be long-term rather than sudden and dramatic: people dying of cancer years later rather than acute radiation poisoning at the time of the attack. Radioisotopes appropriate for such devices — even the most dangerous — have legitimate medical, commercial and industrial uses. The International Atomic Energy Agency has warned that such radioisotopes are readily available to virtually any country in the world — and they are almost certainly not beyond the reach of even moderately capable nonstate actors. And they can be deadly. In 1987, in Goiania, Brazil, a tiny radiotherapy capsule of cesium chloride salt was accidentally broken open, resulting in four deaths due to sustained exposure and $20 million in damages and cleanup costs. But the RDD is really a contradiction in terms. Maximizing the harmful effects of radiation involves maximizing exposure to the highest possible concentration of the radioisotope. By dispersing the radioisotope, the RDD necessarily dilutes its effectiveness. Meanwhile, the use of an explosion to disperse the radioisotope alerts the intended victims, who evacuate the area. Radioisotopes have been more effectively used in radiological emitting devices (REDs) during targeted assassinations. A deadly radioisotope is concealed, for example, in a victim's office, where the sustained exposure over the course of days and weeks causes lethal effects. REDs are even less complex, and it is somewhat surprising that one has yet to be used in Europe or the United States. On the other end of the spectrum from the Goiania accident is the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in northern Ukraine, when a 1-gigawatt power reactor exploded. It is estimated that more than one hundred times the radiation of the Hiroshima bomb was released — the equivalent of 50 million to 250 million grams of radium. More than 40 different radioisotopes were released, and there was a measurable rise in Cesium-137 levels across the entire European continent. No RDD could aspire to anything close to such effect. Chernobyl wrought untold suffering, and estimates suggest that it may one day ultimately contribute to the deaths of 9,000 people. But many of those are still alive today, more than 20 years later. While STRATFOR by no means seeks to downplay the tragic consequences of this disaster, consider the numbers: 31 people died in the explosion and immediate aftermath. Today, 5.5 million people live in the contaminated zone — many of those within or nearly within the specified European Union's dosage limits for those living near operational nuclear power plants. The most strategic consequence of this sort of destruction is economic. The Chernobyl disaster ultimately cost well in excess of $100 billion. As far as RDDs are concerned, STRATFOR has long characterized them as weapons of mass disruption. The concept has seen much wider discussion following 9/11. And, given the ubiquity of radioisotopes in modern society, effective security surrounding all radioisotopes is not likely. The RDD threat is a reality of the 21st century and is impossible to fully defend against. But the impact of an RDD pales in comparison to what even the most crude nuclear device can do.

Nuclear Devices and Weapons

Indeed, the most rudimentary nuclear device can wreak immediate and extensive devastation. The good news is that, unlike RDDs, a nuclear device is neither easily fabricated nor easily acquired. STRATFOR has discussed the challenges facing state actors that want to embark on such a path. A nuclear weapons program represents a profound and comprehensive commitment of national resources, requiring not just a single facility but a complete industrial base. And the challenges are compounded dramatically when the nation-state seeks to hide the pursuit from the international community. It is not a matter of simply recruiting or kidnapping a few experts. A nuclear weapons program requires the long-term ability to establish and maintain facilities — often very electricity-intensive — and conduct years of experimentation. Immense quantities of materials must be acquired from abroad — everything from raw precursors to fissile material to high-grade industrial components — often subject to intense international scrutiny. It took North Korea extensive Soviet assistance with both civilian and military nuclear technology and more than 50 years to get to the point where it could test a device that fizzled. Though subject to international sanctions, Pyongyang was able to accomplish this with facilities that were never bombed and the industrial resources of the entire nation. Ultimately, even nonstate actors that control territory – such as Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — are regularly disrupted by opposing state actors and would be stretched to coordinate such an effort (holding hostages for years is not the same as sustaining and powering a complex and fixed nuclear development facility for a decade or more). Given the current state of world affairs, it is simply not possible for a nonstate actor to successfully fabricate a nuclear device from scratch. But that's not the only way to obtain one. The nonstate actor could acquire fissile material or other important ingredients — or even a fully fabricated weapon — from someone else. How difficult is this? The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and resulting demise of the Soviet Union were chaotic, and there are known to have been security issues surrounding the Soviet nuclear arsenal outside Russian borders. There is also the rumored loss of "suitcase nukes" — nuclear weapons the Soviets supposedly designed and built in secret to fit, essentially, into a large suitcase. Suitcase nukes have become something of an urban myth in the world of nuclear weapons security. The reality is this: To be reduced to the size of a suitcase, a nuclear weapon would have to be a very sophisticated, high-maintenance device. Even if such a weapon did exist, and even if the Soviets did manage to lose a few and even if those who acquired them were able to also acquire the codes and procedures necessary to arm the weapons, they would not likely be usable. The idea that such a weapon can be stashed in a cave somewhere for nearly two decades and still be a viable weapon is simply not grounded in fact. Complex warheads have elements such as tritium that have to be replaced from time to time. Depending on the device design and element used (uranium or plutonium), even the core might need to be respun. Moreover, complex electronic components essential to the functioning of such a small weapon are unlikely to work with the requisite precision — if at all — after years of neglect. While the U.S. Air Force has had recent custody problems with nuclear weapons, none posed any real threat that a U.S. weapon would fall into someone else's hands. Even if one did, modern weapons are equipped with numerous (and highly classified) layers of safety features — from permissive-action links to safeties that could render the fissile core difficult to repurpose if it were improperly accessed. Not all nuclear arsenals around the world are equal, of course. The security of Pakistan's arsenal has caused perhaps the greatest concern, but it has been a primary U.S. focus since 9/11. However, as long as Pakistan's military remains intact, so should its nuclear arsenal. It is thought the United States might have shared its expertise with nuclear weapon safeties with Pakistan to help ensure high-level government control. A more pressing concern than obtaining a weapon is obtaining fissile material — specifically, highly enriched uranium that contains at least 80 percent of the isotope Uranium 235 and is usable in a nuclear device (this is called "weapons-grade HEU"). Because Uranium 235 is a particularly safe isotope, weapons-grade HEU can be handled by an unprotected human being. (Plutonium, on the other hand, is less of a concern in terms of a terrorist threat not only because it is far more radioactive and much more toxic but also because even the most crude plutonium device requires implosion to create a supercritical mass, which presents numerous challenges all its own.) A sufficient quantity of weapons-grade HEU (100 pounds, say, although a number of factors would determine the necessary quantity for an effective weapon) could hypothetically be fitted into a crude gun-type device that could propel one mass of HEU into another to create a supercritical mass. Such a device would be grossly inefficient and could possibly, with a high degree of luck, achieve a yield of a few kilotons, much less than the Hiroshima bomb. But fabricating a crude device is one thing; obtaining the necessary HEU is something else altogether. Once the HEU is in hand, the remaining hurdles — at least hypothetically — are far more surmountable for the nonstate actor. Great strides have been made in the last five years in securing HEU stocks, which are mainly in the United States and countries of the former Soviet Union (although HEU is used as nuclear reactor fuel worldwide). It is becoming increasingly unlikely that a meaningful quantity could be acquired by a nonstate actor. Nevertheless, the security of weapons-grade HEU remains the single most important factor in preventing nuclear material from falling into the wrong hands.

Deterrence

While nonstate actors are not likely to overcome the challenges of obtaining or building a nuclear weapon, neither are they likely to be deterred by them. The logic of mutually assured destruction is based on mutual vulnerability — the absolute certainly that the other side can hit you as hard as you hit it. In the case of state actors, those vulnerabilities are entire cities –- immobile and inherently exposed population centers. And while some elements of a nuclear arsenal can be made mobile or deployed at sea, much of the nuclear enterprise is necessarily composed of large, fixed and identifiable installations. Nonstate actors like Hezbollah do have centers of gravity — such as specific neighborhoods in Beirut — but not the same targetable population centers, seats of government and military installations that state actors have. If nuclear weapons failed to deter China from launching a massive assault into North Korea in 1950 despite the U.S. nuclear arsenal, or the Arabs from briefly threatening the heart of Israel in 1973 despite the Israeli arsenal, they would have even less deterrent value to al Qaeda. A 350-kiloton strategic warhead (or a tactical nuke, for that matter) is simply too massive a tool to be relevant against an enemy enmeshed in a civilian population. Indeed, some of the more radical (and apocalyptic) groups such as al Qaeda would like nothing more than to provoke the United States into doing something rash against a civilian population center — perhaps sufficient (in its mind, at least) to unite the Muslim world and give rise to a new caliphate. And though a new generation of nuclear weapons might be better tailored to take out deeply buried cave complexes, terrorists who already see the world ruined by Western influence and are prepared to die for their goals cannot be threatened with death — nuclear or otherwise.

Conclusion

The risk of nuclear attack by terrorists is often clouded in hype and alarmism. A risk assessment grounded in actual capabilities puts the risk in a much clearer light. But regardless of how difficult such an attack would be to mount, it could — if successful — have a devastating impact on the target country's economy and collective psyche. And terrorist groups intending to use a nuclear device are not likely to be discouraged by traditional deterrents. As the international system is stuck with the reality of nuclear weapons, so too is it stuck with the specter of nuclear terrorism. Such a threat — posing low risk yet high consequences — warrants continued international vigilance.

Bí mật đen tối của chất phóng xạ mạnh nhất hành tinh: Thảm kịch trăm năm còn day dứt

https://soha.vn/nuoc-mat-marie-curie-cha-de-chat-phong-xa-manh-nhat-hanh-tinh-mat-chong-o-tuoi-39-20181225134930104.htm

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Nhờ phát minh của vợ chồng nhà Curies về chất phóng xạ Radium, cùng công lao to lớn trong việc tách Radium ở dạng kim loại nguyên chất của Marie Curie và André-Louis Debierne, nên vào đầu thế kỷ 20, Radium kim loại lần đầu tiên được sản xuất công nghiệp.

Trong tài liệu nghiên cứu do vợ chồng Curies công bố, Radium tỏ ra vô cùng hữu ích trong lĩnh vực y học, đặc biệt là trong việc tiêu diệt tế bào ung thư. Theo đó, Radium có thể chữa được bệnh ung thu bằng cách tiêu diệt tế bào ác tính nhanh hơn quá trình các tế bào khỏe mạnh thực hiện. Vì thế, Radium nhanh chóng trở thành một trong những phương pháp trị liệu bức xạ (xạ trị) đầu tiên cho bệnh ung thư và các bệnh ngoài da khác.

Ánh sáng xanh lấp lánh tựa các vì sao trên bầu trời đêm lấp lánh đã "mê hoặc" nhiều người. Vì chưa hiểu hết sự nguy hiểm chết người của nguyên tố phóng xạ cực mạnh này, nên thời đó, ai ai cũng tôn vinh Radium là "thần dược", là thuốc trị bách bệnh, và nó được sử dụng ở khắp mọi nơi, trong mọi lĩnh vực.

Trong thời kỳ vàng son của Radium, từ năm 1917 đến 1926, hỗn hợp chứa Radium (mực phát sáng) được sử dụng rộng rãi trong sản xuất đồng hồ. Thảm kịch tại New Jersey là câu chuyện liên quan đến Radium được nhắc mãi về sau.

Khoảng 2000 nữ công nhân tại New Jersey (Mỹ) được thuê để vẽ số và kim chỉ giờ bằng loại mực phát sáng kỳ ảo này. Các công nhân được hướng dẫn là mút đầu vẽ bằng miệng để bút vẽ chứa Radium tạo ra những nét đẹp nhất.

Hậu quả khủng khiếp chẳng ai có thể lường trước được đó là rất nhiều công nhân trong số đó về sau mắc các bệnh kỳ lạ rồi chết mà không rõ nguyên nhân. Vì bác sĩ pháp y bị mua chuộc nên nguyên nhân cái chết của các nữ công nhân này "đóng mác" là chết vì bệnh giang mai!

Không chỉ được sử dụng trong khâu sản xuất đồng hồ, Radium còn là thành-phần-không-thể-thiếu trong kem đánh răng, bánh xà phòng, mỹ phẩm, thuốc, thậm chí là cả trong đồ ăn, với những tác dụng được cường điệu hóa lên như làm trắng răng, mịn da, chữa bệnh và tăng cường sức khỏe.

Tuy nhiên, khi những nghi vấn và lo ngại về sức khỏe bắt đầu xuất hiện vào những năm 1920, ngành công nghiệp sản xuất Radium bắt đầu suy giảm đáng kể.

Ngày nay, Radium hầu như không được sử dụng trong y học, ngoài việc điều trị một số bệnh ung thư xương cụ thể. Vì nó quá đắt và hiếm khi là nguyên liệu phổ biến cho xạ trị, vì thế, Radium được thay thế bằng các nguyên liệu khác như khí Radon và sau đó là đồng vị của Coban.

Tuy nhiên, xạ trị và kiến ​​thức về phóng xạ đi kèm với việc phát hiện ra Radium - nguyên tố có tính phóng xạ mạnh nhất hành tinh - vẫn cực kỳ quan trọng trong lịch sử khoa học của thế giới.

Câu chuyện về Radium với tính chất phóng xạ cực mạnh của nó - đóng vai trò như một con dao hai lưỡi với những lợi ích to lớn và tác động khôn lường lên sức khỏe và môi sinh - luôn phải được cân bằng trước khi nó mang đến những thảm họa tương tự như New Jersey.

Đó là lý do, cây viết của Independent phải nói rằng: Sự bùng nổ và tàn lụi của Radium trong 3 thập kỷ đầu thế kỷ 20 vẫn là một trong những câu chuyện cảnh tỉnh chúng ta trong thời đại mới.