When the Irregular becomes the new Paradigm

The public institutions always learned about the nonconventional warfare as a doctrine to promote new skills, use of technologies and counterballance of power through the nations, using economic warfare and special operations over traditional defenses, and diplomatic negotiations in order to promote perpetual peace, under a paradigm of perpetual pax.

After the 90's the paradigm of warfare became a irregular scenario, promoted by small warfare groups, use of technology, as in Iraq-Iran war the Scuds, stealth aircrafts and more and more precisious howitzers, the internet in the battlefield, after this, the pixel cammo and than the private military companies and use of cybernetics.

The RAM brought to the scenario a new level of warfare, that becames the new paradigm of warfare, the substitution of direct combats and total warfare through small battles, promoting psychological warfare, irregular warfare, using the nuances of the scenario in favour of the opearations, as criminal activities, civil mercenaries, ex-warriors, terrorism, guerrilla, robotics, internet and economic warfare.

So, there must have be dynamism at doctrine, capability of mobolity, disrupture at the proccesses of field, the counter insurgencies and counter terrorism troops must have Commando's operations capability, a kind of hierarchy break to promote the real battle in order to the classic doctrine.

Troops must be able to fight terrorism, web, cybernetics, inssurrections, upheavals, civilian armed, and backup of regular forces also to the insurgents and governments.

This plans to the scenario a new usage of force, like attacking non military targets, economic and military blocs and public armies.

But this paradigm is not new. History proven that Irregular was the behind the curtians of each warfare. Otto Skorzeny did behind the curtains operations with multiple languages to trick enemies. Also infiltration and assassination operations, and assault operations to save Mussolini at his prision.

The annexation of Danzig was possible because of operations of Admiral Canaris using infiltration and sabotage operations in Poland, contract of Polish people that supported the German government.

Uses of mercenaries was common in contemporary and medieval battles, since ancient times in Roman battles, the use of Elephants by Hannibal, the difference between Persian Empire and Greek Empire in Peloponesian warfare showed that soverengn of small armies with high combat capabilities. Troyan warfare was the first case with study on irregular warfare. Infiltration, downfall, invasion of temples, many nations invading one nation, many armies against one. Use of religion to promote peaceful conditions for murdering... For love they hammered the world.

Vietnam showed the capabilities of Guerrilla Warfare and small guerrilla groups under fire of aircrafts and regular armies crush the enemies with irregular methods.

Later in Africa the Mercenaries fighting and the scenario of revolutionary armies and criminal activities, the chaotic scenario was favorable to the ones who implemented technology together their military capability, than Executive Outcomes was victorious in each direct combat, making possible the independence of the countries and form a governmental unity.

In Nicaragua the contras over the Sandinist revolutionaries and in Europe the Operation Gladio with the contract of mercenaries to infiltration, sabotage and assassination of communist parties in Italy.

And nowadays the affirmative after the war on terror and the scholars of the asymmetric warfare, since Creveld to Kaldor, the possibility of the core of the conflicts over the physical space is now a subject of study and action between regular armies.

RAM brought the world the analysis of Russian scholars and military strategists to understand the Maoist strategy of infiltration, guerrilla, over population, migration, economic warfare and use the technologies to promote communication over battlefields, surpassing the location of the enemies and with capability to preview their actions.

The support of the Airforce is called to the logistic and fire together the infantry and teh use of drones can make capable the attack from long range actions, and assassination operations. This method changed and challenged the education of military schools to provide combat trainning and the peacekeepers at the diplomatic corps. The new form of conduction of a peaceful stability depends now on diverse agents, some of them not in government, many of the out of the core of the combat and acting in network.

Planners have been developing and mandating a capacity courses and the exchange of expertise is important at this tipocs to improve their capabilities, under cultural basis, the adaptation of Clausewitzian warfare to promote integrated operations. 

Beyond the years of warfare, Gen. Guderian proved that the moral of the troops and the front attack should be supported by integrated troops, raising the metaphisics of the warfare and the physical capability, gaining advantage.

The non-linear or non-traditional combat continue to be a norm but the doctrine must be dynamic, adapting faster to the constant changing in paradigms of politics, spread of information, fake news, civilian and non uniformed personal, private forces and cyber warfare, integration of non-tripulated and tripulated aircrafts.

The new regular is the non-regular forces, linear conflicts are done by non-linear actors...

Services Have Learned Irregular Warfare, Leaders Say

https://www.defencetalk.com/services-have-learned-irregular-warfare-leaders-say-38142/

The military has institutionalized lessons learned from the past decade of nonconventional warfare and will work to maintain doctrine and skills that allow the services to balance readiness for traditional defenses as well as irregular fighting, service leaders told a congressional committee today.

“In 2002, the nation effectively went to war with two armies,” Maj. Gen. Peter Bayer, the Army’s director of strategy, plans and policy, told the House Armed Services Committee. “One, comprised of general-purpose forces, was prepared to excel against traditional adversaries in direct combat. The second, comprised largely of special operations forces, was prepared to prevail in an irregular environment.

“The Army quickly learned that success on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq required adaptation in both general-purpose and special operations forces,” Bayer said. The Army has adapted since then by institutionalizing irregular warfare capabilities and capacity across the force, he said.

Bayer was joined by Rear Adm. Sinclair M. Harris, director of the Navy irregular warfare office; Brig. Gen. Daniel O’Donohue, director of the Marine Corps’ capabilities development directorate; and Brig. Gen. Jerry P. Martinez, director for joint integration in the Air Force’s directorate of operational capability requirements. All four said readiness for irregular warfare is critical to future operations, and they described how each of the services has blended conventional and irregular warfighting doctrine and skills.

The Navy has leveraged its Navy Expeditionary Combat Command and established maritime partnership stations and maritime headquarters with maritime operations centers to meet demands, Harris said. “The evolution of intelligence and strike capabilities has enabled the Navy to meet urgent combatant commander requirements for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations,” he said.

The Navy Irregular Warfare Office, created in 2008, has led the institutionalization of irregular capabilities, Harris said.

The Marine Corps has designed a readiness force for post-Afghanistan operations – beyond 2014 – “that mitigates this hybrid threat, creates options and provides decision space for senior leadership” that considers joint, interagency and allied responses, O’Donohue said.

That force will be fundamentally different from the current or pre-9/11 force, O’Donohue said. “It draws on a rich history of innovations in irregular warfare, but is recast as a scalable crisis response force ready to counter complex irregular, conventional and hybrid threats – and the gray areas in between,” he said.

“Above all,” O’Donohue added, “we prepare to operate in and adapt to unpredictable, uncertain, complex environments at a moment’s notice.” He noted that irregular warfare is not new, and had the same definition in the Marines’ Small Wars Manual of 1940 as it does today.

As for the Air Force, Martinez said, the service is part of a larger, joint, coalition effort, and that works to supplement or improve host-nation and regional capabilities. “Air power directly contributes by establishing a secure environment in which the partner nation can flourish, ultimately without direct assistance,” he said.

By assessing, training, advising and equipping a troubled partner air force, airmen can contribute to that nation’s sovereignty and legitimacy while creating opportunities for economic growth, political development and stability, he added.

Like his counterparts at the hearing, Martinez said the Air Force’s challenge going forward will be how to balance the requirements for irregular warfare with those of traditional fighting, although he added that an increase in capabilities in one area usually helps the other.

The most important thing the Army can do to advance the institutionalization of irregular warfare is to continue educating its leaders, Bayer said.

“By developing adaptive and creative leaders, the Army ensures its ability to respond to a wide range of future tasks,” he said. “Maintaining a highly professional education system is crucial to institutionalizing the lessons of the past decade and ensuring that we do not repeat the mistakes of post-Vietnam by thinking that these kinds of operations are behind us.”

Future battlefields will be populated with hybrid threats, Bayer said, with combinations of regular and irregular tactics against enemies that include terrorists and criminal groups. The Army must remain flexible to operate against “whatever the threat” and in all types of settings, he said.

“As pressures for cuts in defense spending and force structures increase, the Army must assess which capabilities to emphasize, how many of each, and at what level,” he said. “Finding the right mix will be a challenge.”

The key to advancing the Army’s ability to respond to irregular threats will be to ensure the necessary force structure to support a versatile mix of capabilities in an uncertain future, he said.

The Army demonstrated flexibility in Iraq and Afghanistan with modular brigades that included a host of irregular warfare specialties, including information operations, public affairs and civil affairs, Bayer said.

All of the officers said foreign language and cultural training will grow as a requirement for service members.

Irregular Warfare and the New Normal

As the nation’s military focus evolves, it is clear that Air Force Civil Engineers will be called upon to support many new non-traditional roles and responsibilities.

http://themilitaryengineer.com/index.php/item/243-irregular-warfare-and-the-new-normal

Air Force Doctrine Document 3-34, Engineer Operations, specifies that U.S. Air Force (AF) engineers “provide, operate, maintain, and protect sustainable installations as weapon system platforms through engineering and emergency response services.”

However, since 9/11, Air Force Civil Engineers repeatedly have been called to fill much farther-reaching mission sets. As President Obama has stated: “We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability operations…while ensuring our force is ready to address the full range of military operations.” Therefore, as warfare continues to evolve, all U.S. military personnel can anticipate supporting joint-service teams with irregular warfare missions such as stability operations.

If this is the direction we are headed, then the question we must continually ask ourselves is, “Are we ready?”

EDUCATING AIRMEN

Military Doctrine drives our current and future investments in equipment, manpower and training. The shift toward irregular warfare is evident in the increasing role engineers and other support personnel have played in stability operations. Stability operations are missions conducted in coordination with host nation organizations to strengthen legitimacy, establish security, aid reconstruction efforts and provide essential governmental services. A number of Department of Defense (DOD) and joint and service publications define the organizational roles and responsibilities within stability operations. Each document places an equal emphasis on stability and combat operations. None is more succinct than the 2009 DOD Instruction 3000.05, Stability Operations, which states: “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”

Over the last decade, one of the primary units executing stability operations has been Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). PRTs typically total 60 to 90 members, composed of U.S. and international military, Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and other civilian personnel. Historically, six of the 12 U.S.-led PRTs were staffed by Air Force personnel. PRT members advise and assist the host nation and bolster host nation governmental agencies with economic, infrastructure, military, political and any other assistance. Most of this assistance is provided on the ground, in harm’s way, and fostered through relationships built over time in face-to-face meetings, village councils and other daily interactions.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, Air Force support personnel have been called to operate within the land domain—but outside their traditional and doctrinal air-installation support roles. These operations have stretched engineers and challenged education providers and combat trainers to keep pace with their ever-evolving readiness needs and prepare them to conduct stability operations with a “proficiency equivalent to combat operations.”

ADAPTING TO CHANGING DEMANDS

The gap in education and training between traditional and non-traditional roles begins at the tactical level. New airmen are educated on and assigned to Air Force units where they perform traditional Air Force missions using the traditional Air Force way of doing business. As they progress, their training broadens to focus on how to enable and operate the tenets of air power, and how the U.S. military, and, more specifically, the U.S. Air Force is structured to conduct wars and support the National Security Strategy. When airmen individually deploy as part of a PRT or other advisory role in a stability operations unit, they are forced to operate in a completely new operational domain.

Wartime planners have responded by developing and mandating a host of pre-deployment courses. Airmen are instructed on combat-related topics such as counter-improvised explosive devices, use of force, and weapons qualifications during pre-deployment training. Cultural basics, awareness, and other forms of culture and advisory training seek to inform personnel on how to operate in-tune with local customs. These courses are intended to provide a foundation in land-based operations, but little time is spent training the actual execution of integrated stability operations. Those skills require years of continued preparedness and education. One cannot learn the intricacies of stability-operations overnight, nor be expected to master them all via a whirlwind of non-stop just-in-time training. This expectation belittles the on-the-ground challenges, and puts airmen at risk of mission failure.

ADDRESSING STRATEGIC NEEDS

In 2009, in an attempt to overcome this shortfall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen established the Afghanistan Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program to “develop a cadre of experts who speak the local language, are culturally attuned, and focused on regional issues for an extended duration.” Airmen were hand-picked for the first teams and given highly specialized training to perform stability operations full-time—alternating a year in the field and a year at home-station conducting training for four-year assignments. By 2011, the AFPAK Hands Program had approximately 250 personnel, with 20 percent Air Force sourcing. While successful in fostering the ability to focus solely on a stability mission, the program has been unable to ensure that airmen assigned to traditional home-station support functions are not called upon to perform alongside AFPAK Hands personnel in PRTs and as host-nation trainers and partners elsewhere.

These non-traditional responsibilities continue to be the norm, and not just for a select cadre but for a considerable number of Air Force support personnel. Consequently, perhaps the time has come to include stability operations training in both initial skills training courses and as a part of ongoing annual requirements. For Air Force Civil Engineers, training would focus on contracting support, project oversight, planning and execution of new construction projects, and village- and provincial-level maintenance planning. Additional instruction would be needed to prepare them to train host and partner nations.

While the development of such ongoing training programs is no small task, once implemented they would reduce pre-deployment training cost and time impacts on existing forces. Still, a shift to preparedness in both the land and air domains would challenge educators and trainers to develop programs that ensure the retention of even more information beyond the current baseline. This engineer-force-wide baseline of knowledge could provide a broader pool of personnel to select from for future stability operations.

UNDERSTANDING OUR ROLE

As the focal point for Air Force Civil Engineer continuing education, The Civil Engineer School at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, is well-situated to lead the change and connect engineers with the resources and education they need to succeed in non-traditional environments.

Over the past decade the school has been forced to look beyond the traditional classroom to meet non-traditional just-in-time training requirements. It has created new lessons, exercises and entire courses for deploying engineers; hosted classes; placed course material on the web; and mailed material out on DVDs to engineers already in the field. In addition, partnerships with sister-service engineers have led to the development of the Joint Engineer Operations Course, a week-long course offered six times a year, and faculty instruction of contingency construction and inspection training at the Provincial Reconstruction Training Course at Camp Atterbury, Ind. What these and other similar courses do best is provide space for conversations between engineers of all services and with varying levels of experience. Additionally, since Air Force Civil Engineers often deploy not as a unit from a single installation, but as individuals from across the Air Force, best practices and lessons learned in the classroom quickly can be disseminated worldwide upon returning to home station.

The frenetic pace of deployments for more than a decade has created a cadre of highly capable officers and enlisted airmen with a vast range of non-traditional experiences and capabilities. For them, learning how to perform stability operations and how best to oversee, and teach others to oversee construction projects and the maintenance of national infrastructure oftentimes took place through trial and error. Thanks to their lessons learned, courses and training programs have caught up with the need and established a robust network for the transfer and sharing of best practices. The challenge is to ensure that level of experience is maintained going forward.

Throughout combat operations draw-downs in Iraq and Afghanistan, our nation’s leaders have made it clear that the U.S. military will continue to use the tenets of irregular warfare to achieve national security goals.

As the irregular becomes regular, and non-traditional roles become the norm, we must continue to learn, practice and prepare for whatever—and wherever—comes next.

Capt. Luke T. Donovan, M.SAME, USAF, is Architectural Engineering Instructor, and Capt. Timothy D. Callahan, P.E., M.SAME, USAF, is Course Director & Instructor, The Civil Engineer School, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. They can be reached at 937-255-5654 Ext. 3552, or luke.donovan@afit.edu; and 937-255-5654 Ext. 3539, or timothy.callahan@afit.edu, respectively.