Africa - The Neo-New-Imperialism? Russian and U.S.A. searching for new proxies and geopolitical influences

In the honest form of saying, Russia is raising a new state, mercenary, under a constitution and leadership following precepts of State, legal and societal form. While many countries have tradition of the PMCs, the Russian style is different. The distinction is the complexity that questions, specially Wagner Group, that is a outfit for the governmental and political means, being an arm of the politics, just like Sadat is to Turkey.

Not following the Blackwater model, Russia doesn't have rules or regulations that USA requires for the private military and security, and in charge, it's illegal the mercenary activity in country. Wagner is a Russian offshore company. According to Maria Zabolotsakaya, a member of the Legal Division of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “under Russian law, it is not possible to set up a PMC or use one abroad.” This is because PMCs are not regulated under Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code, as mercenaries and their financing are not allowed. Furthermore, Article 208 prohibits the formation of armed groups – which is backed up by Article 13 of the Russian Constitution. However, these laws are neither followed nor enforced nor clearly understood by Russian law. Even an effort to pass a law in the Russian Duma in 2018 that would have defined PMCs in Russia was rejected by the Ministry of Defense.

To maintain the Russian interests to their core objectives, Wagner works in shadows, small companies, forming new companies phantom to operate as tentacles and a psywar, promoting many fronts working for the core of the Russian objectives. It's different to be a paramilitary force - simple explanation - but is an ability to work close to Russian governments and interests, more like priorize the relation to President Vladimir Putin.

The transition of the world shadow forces to Wagner era is no surprose. Wagner group opened many fronts and got successfuly in all of them, opening to Ukraine, Syria, Venezuela and North Korea, also, following the paradigms of the hybrid conflicts, as opening fronts to a total war and the metaphisical war, with cyberspace, propaganda, terror state and psyops.

The point is to set for Africa, when they opened a front to Libya, the Central Afric Republic became a point to Wagner's strategic position, sieging the European and Western activities, and Russia always was a partner of African countries. Yemen is not far eighter, following the business model of acquiring partners, the competitive advante of a group that have solutions to possible scenarios. In Central Afric Republic, the Mercenaries started a training center to give advantage and expertise to governments armies and local paramilitary pro-government, and anti-terrorist groups. 

Remember that Africa is the continent that most of the mercenaries activities happened and Executive Outcomes became the first step of this business model in Africa, promoting political advantage under contract.

After this era, and in the post-Blackwater era, STTEP International, the former Executive Outcomes leader company, did a joruney against the Boko Haram group, with counter terrorist measures, that was hijacked by the corruption and non continuation of the program. But the PMCs kept the importance of the political continuation under fire and contract.

Witht his presence, Wagner group can be arms of Russia presented in many fronts, with competitive advantage and a political strong partnership, Russia's new prohminent geo-strategic superpower in Africa and operating in shadows with anti-terrorist sets and diplomatic influence, in charge of military bases and environmental resources.

Russian Private Military Companies in Africa: What Are They Doing There?

"PMC Wagner" in Africa.

Why Russia is increasing its presence in the region.

https://petrimazepa.com/en/russian_private_military_companies_in_africa_what_are_they_doing_there

A recent thorough investigation by the Le Figaro journalists Tanguy Berthemet and Alain Barluet regarding the activity of mysterious Russian military forces on the Black continent had a sound resonance in Europe and directed the public attention to the large-scale Kremlin game in a fight for influence and resources in this region.

Of course, the interest on influential French media to what’s happening in the far away Africa is not accidental. Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali (a former French Sudan), Equatorial Guinea, Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), Niger, Burkina Faso (a former Republic of Upper Volta), Benin (a former Dahomey), Togo, Gabon, Central African Republic (a former Ubangi-Shari), Chad, Cameroon — is a just an incomplete list of old and recent past of colonial France. And the events in their former colonies cannot leave France indifferent. France is especially sensitive to growing influence of Russia on political situations in these former French enclaves.

Central African Republic in Focus of Attention

Central African Republic, a small state in Central Africa, always had a special place in French and European foreign relations. No matter the small population, the geopolitical location of this country let it to influence a lot on the neighboring African states, such as Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Chad, and even to shape a political agenda of the whole African continent, to some degree. That’s why the interest of Russia to this small state causes a certain anxiety between Western politicians. Since the growing presence of Russia military forces in CAR directly affects the destabilization in the whole region.

A Russian influence was quick to be felt in this small country. A known for his lack of will president of CAR removed the Rwanda’s “blue helmets” which provided his security. Thus, the security of president Faustin-Archange Touadéra consists of no less than 40 Russians. In October 2018 president Touadéra met Sergey Lavrov in Sochi. Russian minister suggested a gifts to Touadéra, consisting of 5200 AK-47s, 840 machine guns, 270 grenade launchers. All the UN has to do is to ratify this gift, and in the beginning of 2018 the weaponry was already in Bangui. More even, Moscow officially sent to CAR 175 instructors: 5 military and 170 “civilians” to train the government military forces (FACA). Russian military members, their quantity unknown, now live in Bangui, in the capital of Central African Republic. In the same October 2018 Moscow proclaimed that will be sending to Bangui 60 more instructors for FACA.

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At the moment the biggest danger to CAR stability would be assorted rebel groups from “Séléka”, a Muslim rebel militia at the north of country, which aim for legalization and for getting to the power. The interfaith conflict between Muslims and Christians lasts since 2013, and in October the crisis went to a new round because of removing Abdou Karim Meckassoua from the post of President of the National Assembly — Abdou Karim Meckassoua being a Muslim, while the president of CAR Faustin-Archange Touadéra is a Christian. Considering all this, President Touadéra, who came to power after a civil war of 2001-2003, needed some help from the outside. And that’s when Russia “accidentally” came into sight…

It is not France alone who is worried by the activity of Russian military (most of which are in fact a mercenaries of a private military company) in CAR, even though France is worried the most. Though CAR is not a French colony any more, France influence in the country is at high. The abundance of Russians in the country is deemed to be an intention of dislodging France from this region of Africa. And these concerns are well founded. The military presence is but one sign of Russian attempts to secure its positions in Africa. The unprecedented anti-French propagandist campaign is spreading in the country. Not only local Central African media are criticizing the French policies, but “Russia Today” joined them, as well as TV channels of the neighboring Cameroon. For example, the September 1979 French “Barracuda” operation is now widely covered in the negative light — an operation when French commandos overthrown the cannibal dictator Jean-Bédel Bokassa, which in turn lead to series of coups and takeovers on the background of social instability and lowering of living standards, as much as civil war with a numerous victims among the civil population.

Who’s Listening to Wagner?

The appearance of armed Russians has shaken the relative stability in Central African Republic of last years. What’s more important, Russian diplomats started a secret negotiations with rebel groups regarding the division of authority and shares of ore mining profits between rebels and government.

But apparently there is little hope for the fruits of peaceful negotiations between opposing forces in CAR. That’s why Putin, as often, as it was in Syria and Ukraine, relied on solving the problem in his usual ways.

And of course he immediately remembered of the Wagner Group (also known as PMC Wagner, ChVK Wagner, or CHVK Vagner), which shined both in Ukraine (where its mercenaries fought against Ukrainian army since 2014) and in Syria (where the private military company fights on the side of Syrian regime). Using mercenaries is very convenient for Putin. First of all, private military companies allow for more or less plausible denial of Moscow being involved into the ambiguous international conflicts. This also helps to avoid the public discontent because of military losses.

As, mercenary doesn’t exist from the official point of view. And if one will perish, this is not counted for military losses of aggressor state.

A team of Moscow visitors travelled by a flight Damascus—Bangui in the April of 2018, set its training camp in Berengo, a former residence of emperor Bokassa, 65 kms from the capital. A part of soldiers are living in Bangui. And if military instructors (according to a reliable source in Bangui) are simply doing their job and nothing more, the goals of “civilians” are completely unknown, even though their number increased from 170 to 400. According to French journalists, these “civilians” are official representatives of mysterious company “Sewa Security Services”, established in November 2018 in Bangui. But it became known that “Sewa Security Services” is nothing but a cover for PMC Wagner, infamous with their involvement in Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts.

It is known that the idea of using mercenaries for “dirty ways” of solving Kremlin’s political issues in other countries (without direct involvement of true beneficiary) was suggested by Yevgeny Prigozhin, one of the Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. It was an investigation into such activities that led to a mysterious deaths of three Russian journalists in CAR in the end of July 2018. After “having their shift” on Donbass and in Syria, a mercenaries of PMC Wagner came to CAR — obviously, not to take part in the rebuilding of local industry. They joined another Russian mercenaries, who came from Sudan, where Moscow is also especially active in the recent years. People from PMC Wagner have since been seen in different regions of country, including eastern city of Bria, rich in gold and diamonds. And this is not an accident. Political goals of Russians in Central African Republic are supported by a financial interest, directed onto the exploitation of matural resources, as French and Libyans did once. Deposits of diamonds, uranium, gold, oil, forest and hydroenergy sources — all good reasons for the Putin expansion into Africa.

The economic expansion (with a military support of Wagner group) now is complemented with the official registration of Russian presence in CAR, which is helped greatly by a strong influence of Russian Federation on the highest officials of the country. A Russian citizen Valety Zakharov serves as a national security advisor to CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. It is well known in CAR that Zakharov answers not only to President Touadéra but also to Moscow. Mikhail Bogdanov, a deputy minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, is often visiting CAR as well, as he is authorized to conduct affairs in Africa. And he gets some results. As the consequence, Ministry of Finance and Budget of Central African Republic issued documents providing the “Lobaye Invest” mining company with rights for prospecting and developing of natural resources. Documents state that “Lobaye Invest” got a right for its operations in CAR for three years, starting July 2018. It conducts the exploration of gold deposits on two territories, one with an area of 385 km2, second 3712 km2. Both territories are located west of the Bangui, a capital of CAR, and are under control of Christian militia group “Anti-balaka”, which opposes the Muslim group “Séléka”. PWC Wagner fighters were needed to solve the issue of Muslim group.

The “Lobaye Invest” itself was created in 2017 by someone Yevgeny Khodotov, a 54-year-old security forces veteran from St. Petersburg; but many consider a real boss to be noone but Yevgeny Prigozhin. And it is not an accident again that the activities of the company are classified, and there are some radical measures taken to anyone who try to investigate the details of the Russian presence in CAR. That was Ndassima, a location place of “Lobaye Invest”, which Russian journalists Orkhan Dzhemal, Alexander Rastorguev and Kirill Radchenko intended to visit in July. They were making a film about private military companies, and they were killed. In the end of September a freelance journalist from CAR Louis Kottoy, who was investigating the deaths of Russian journalists and the activities of PMC Wagner mercenaries, were attacked and beaten up by the unknown not far from his home in Bangui. Two weeks before attack on Kottoy, Pyotr Verzilov, a member of anti-Kremlin protest group “Pussy Riot”, was poisoned while waiting for results of private investigation of deaths of journalists in Sibut. In addition, Russian military instructors who are living in Sibut and training CAR military, warned a local people, especially those living next to a place where dead bodies of journalists were found, that they will be punished if will give interviews about the murders.

As we can see, Russia is able to protect its secrets in Africa.

While officially denying the allegations of using PMC Wagner in the implementing of Kremlin hegemony designs, in practice Russian government is more than sympathetic to a private military companies. For example, Mikhail Bogdanov, a Special Presidential Representative for the Middle East and Africa, and a deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, in his interview to a French newspaper “La Croix” openly supported such structures, only bothered by their official legal status: “We have no issues with PMC Wagner. This is an organization created by former soldiers, which use their military skills for security tasks. Many companies of this kind exist. We were way behind of Americans and Brits. Perhaps we should make some legal clarification of such companies actions.”

There is no doubt that economic activities of Russian Federation in CAR, aside from everything else, also counts on a “chain reaction” from another African countries rich in natural resources. Russian activity already intensified in Angola and Equatorial Guinea — another two states with rich deposits.

Today Russia is building up on its presence in Africa more and more. They actively use the propagandists’ cliché of economic dependency of African states from the former colonial states, and of necessity of changing this. Kremlin propagandists put a particular hopes into a network of engineers, teachers, politicians, policemen and soldiers, who were studying in Soviet Union; into a tempting propositions of Russia to restructure debts inherited from Soviet Union into investments, which can be arranged as a transfer of rights of usage of Russian companies in the oil sector, agricultural sector, energy market, fishing, metal processing industry. Another point is made that Kremlin is ready to cooperate with any governments which would want this, no matter their political system or ideology. With the very same aim, about a year ago Russia made a generous gesture of annulation of debts of some African countries, over 20 billion dollars of debts total.

Putin’s Russia aims to restore the influence it had in the Soviet era through the developing countries, and Russian activity in Africa will not be limited with Central African Republic. We should expect to hear about Russian concessions “protected by PMC Wagner” in other countries, such as Sudan, Chad, Rwanda and Gabon.

Ukraine, Syria, CAR —And Beyond

So, what is PMC Wagner?

We know that Russia uses similar structures outside of all legal conventions. But when we speak of “private military companies” we must understand that these are nothing but mercenaries.

Whenever the PMC Wagner is discussed, there is one name mentioned, that would be Dmitry Utkin, a former GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) officer. Back in 2013 Utkin became one of the leaders of another private military company “Moran Security Group”, under the codename “Wagner”. “Moran Security Group” was using a St. Petersburg organization “Slavonic Corps” to hire Russian former soldiers to protect the oil deposits and pipelines and Syria. Some claim that mission was a disaster, and “Slavonic Corps” suffered tremendous losses because of inferior training and the lack of weaponry. In 2014 Utkin founded the “Wagner Group” for solving of “delicate problems” outside the Russia borders. Its fighters were engaged in the Crimea annexation in spring of 2014, later on Donbass on the side of pro-Russian separatists, and starting 2015 they are represented in Syria. Mercenaries of Wagner were engaged in the Palmira reclamation in March 2016 on the side of Syrian army with the help of Russian aviation.

Wagner’s fighters are mostly the former soldiers of Russia military and task forces, which have enough of experience from trouble spots from Afghanistan to Vietnam, and from Chechnya to Nagorno-Karabakh. When signing the contract, Wagner mercenaries also sign the memorandum of their obligations. For example, they must state that they act on their own free will and personal beliefs, that they will not be used in military conflicts, they must swear to keep silent about their professional activity for ten years. Mercenary is also required to not have any accounts in social media, and to not make any photos or videos during the service.

A middleman company “Evro Polis” is in charge of signing contracts with the Wagner “volunteers”, as well as of financial operations; it also hosts all the documents on PMC and all the documents of mercenaries. In this (supposedly purely private) company Yevgeny Prigozhin owns a big share, and in fact serves as a connection and coordination link with the clients from Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense. It is he who informs the leadership of PMC Wagner of tactical tasks agreed with Ministry of Defense of Russia, of tasks and means of particular special operation, and he is also in charge of supplying the mercenaries with the weapons, ammunition and equipment. According to the available data, the salary of mercenaries present on the battlefield abroad is between 1350 and 3600 Euros, depending from the position and the rank.

The history of “Evro Polis” is also of some interest. This Moscow-based company, first being in the restaurant business, in 2016 suddenly switched to oil and gas deposits development, and then opened an office in Damascus. In 2016 Yevgeny Prigozhin signed a contract with Syrian government which guarantees to him a 25% share of all oil deposits which would be taken by PMC Wagner from Jihad group “Islamic State”.

The connections of Utkin with the highest levels of Russian government are not proclaimed, but neither are they hidden. In December of 2016 Utkin, together with other fighters of PMC Wagner was accepted by Vladimir Putin in Kremlin during the ceremony for Russian “heroes” in Syria.

In November 2017 Dmitry Utkin became a CEO of “Concord Management & Consulting” company, which also is owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin. This is the very same company accused by USA in the financing of Internet trolls with a goal of disruption of presidential elections in USA in 2016.

The Disappointing Conclusion

It is clear that Russian state tries to distance itself from the mercenaries akin to PMC Wagner, yet still Kremlin has no intent of discharging or recalling them, because that would call for replacing them with regular army, and therefore, to admit the real losses in personnel. PMC Wagner is one of many paramilitary organizations on the service of Kremlin, which is used to promote the Russian interests without the direct affiliation of government. Using such groups makes it easier for Kremlin to mask the military operations and to hide the real numbers of losses. Perhaps this is an important argument for Moscow to preserve this semi-legal zone and to postpone the legislative regulations of private and partially-governmental military companies.

It is natural that Russian activities like these are not dangerous to CAR, Syria and Libya alone, but poses a danger for the whole African continent.

And what’s most important is that the covert diplomacy of Russia discredits the work of UN and undermines the principles of international security.

Rusia regresa a África

Con hábiles movimientos, el Kremlin intenta recuperar el terreno perdido en el continente africano

https://elpais.com/elpais/2019/04/30/ideas/1556637150_076733.html

Rusia esta trabajando duro para recuperar su influencia geopolítica mundial. Aislado por las sanciones diplomáticas occidentales, a la campaña para estrechar los lazos con sus socios históricos Moscú ha sumado una activa política para captar nuevos aliados en otros frentes. Y en ambos escenarios está África, dejada de lado por Estados Unidos y donde Europa pierde influencia desde hace años. Con una estrategia que combina la cooperación militar y las inversiones con la diplomacia energética y económica, el país euroasiático está ganando terreno en ese continente, donde en las últimas décadas China se ha convertido en el primer socio comercial.

Con hábiles movimientos para influir en más zonas del tablero geoestratégico global, Rusia está construyendo infraestructuras y haciendo inversiones en países como Angola, Egipto o República Centroafricana. Busca no solo señalarse como la gran potencia que fue. También aprovechar el colosal potencial energético y las reservas minerales de algunos de esos Estados y encontrar nuevos mercados para su industria de defensa, que aún tiene recorrido en África. Con ello, Moscú busca garantizarse el apoyo de estos países y apuntalar sus posiciones en organizaciones internacionales. En la ONU, por ejemplo, en 2014 varios países africanos se abstuvieron de votar la resolución de condena a Rusia por su anexión de la península ucrania de Crimea.

Es en cierta manera un déjà vu. La Unión Soviética tuvo una gran influencia y fuertes vínculos en varios países africanos. En su pleno apogeo, la URSS apoyó los movimientos de independencia contra las colonias occidentales. Además, líderes y políticos africanos se educaron en instituciones soviéticas durante la Guerra Fría. Como João Lourenço, el presidente de Angola, que estudió en la elitista Academia Político-Militar de Lenin. O Ahmed Gaid Salah, jefe del Estado Mayor de Argelia, que se aferra al poder tras la salida de Abdelaziz Buteflika, a quien Moscú apoyaba.

Los Gobiernos posteriores a la independencia de Mozambique, Guinea-Bisáu, República Democrática del Congo, Egipto, Somalia, Uganda o Argelia recibieron en algún momento apoyo militar o diplomático de la URSS. Hasta que, en 1991, se derrumbó y Rusia perdió el interés por la política exterior de largo alcance. Ahora parece haber recuperado el apetito. Y en su menú está África. “Está en línea con la estrategia de Vladímir Putin de restaurar su imagen de gran potencia y líder global”, dice Theo Neethling, de la Universidad Free State de Sudáfrica.

Moscú, que ha brindado alivio de la deuda a algunos de estos países por cantidades que se remontaban a la época de la URSS, ha colocado ese legado en el núcleo de su política hacia el continente africano. “A diferencia de las antiguas potencias mundiales, Rusia no se ha contaminado con los crímenes de la esclavitud y el colonialismo”, disparó el Ministerio de Exteriores ruso en un comunicado el año pasado, previo a una gira de su titular, Serguéi Lavrov, por varios países del continente. El Kremlin prepara además su primera cumbre Rusia-África este año. El interés del presidente Putin por el continente africano contrasta con el nulo interés y la desidia que muestra la Administración de Donald Trump.

Los analistas sostienen que Rusia está demostrando tener interés por brindar apoyo con recursos mínimos hacia cualquier país cuyo Gobierno sea escéptico hacia Occidente. También le mueven la falta de transparencia de los proyectos y el prácticamente nulo control ambiental de estos. El Kremlin no solo desea recuperar su papel de superpotencia. Rusia ha sido uno de los últimos actores en desembarcar hoy en África, pero allí ha encontrado hueco para tres de sus sectores estratégicos: la industria militar, la energética y la mineral.

“Estamos viendo un retorno ruso que está tratando de encontrar un nicho donde pueda ser competitivo. Y es, fundamentalmente, las armas”, resalta Paul Stronski, uno de los autores de El retorno de la Rusia global, un extenso dosier del Carnegie Institute. Rusia es el segundo mayor exportador de material de defensa del mundo. Y una buena parte va a países africanos. Egipto es uno de sus mayores compradores; también Argelia y Marruecos. Además, ha mantenido vínculos militares desde hace años con Zimbabue, Nigeria o Etiopía. En los últimos años ha establecido además un servicio de mantenimiento de equipos militares y programas de modernización de armamento. Y es en este terreno prácticamente el único en el que puede competir con China. Entre 2013 y 2017, Rusia suministró el 39% de las armas importadas en África; el gigante asiático, el 17%, y Estados Unidos, el 11%, según el Instituto para la Paz de Estocolmo, que estima que en 2017 Rusia vendió el doble de armas que en 2012.

Asesinato de periodistas

Moscú se había ido moviendo en el continente africano sin levantar mucha atención. Pero en julio de 2018, el asesinato de tres periodistas rusos que investigaban la presencia de compatriotas mercenarios del oscuro Grupo Wagner en República Centroafricana puso sobre la mesa no solo las inversiones públicas rusas en la región, sino los intereses en la explotación mineral de empresarios privados y sus vínculos con las autoridades. Los periodistas asesinados trataban de desentrañar si los paramilitares de Wagner —una compañía vinculada al núcleo más cercano del presidente Putin— estaban involucrados en la explotación mineral de ese país. Y el caso destapó el envío de contratistas privados a otros países. El despliegue de estos soldados secretos es para muchos analistas una estrategia del Kremlin para que haya presencia rusa en lugares donde no puede estar oficialmente.

Con una economía debilitada por el peso de las sanciones occidentales y la caída del precio de los hidrocarburos, Rusia ha reforzado sus acometidas en los últimos tres años para ganar terreno en el continente. Más allá de sus lazos históricos, ha tratado de encontrar buenos aliados y acuerdos en el África subsahariana, donde su presencia era residual. Su comercio con África aumentó un 26% en 2017.

Lo “sorprendente” es la rapidez con la que actúa, escribe Leslie Varenne, experta africanista y cofundadora del Instituto de Vigilancia y de Estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales y Estratégicas (Iveris). Antes del derrumbe de la URSS, señala la analista, Moscú había firmado 37 pactos de asistencia técnica y económica y 42 acuerdos comerciales. Aunque todavía no ha recuperado las cifras de antaño, va camino.

Moscú está sabiendo aprovechar bien las oportunidades, señala Dalia Ghanem, analista del Centro Carnegie experta en el norte de África. “Tanto la UE como EE UU tendrán que adaptarse a la presencia del Kremlin en África, que se irá extendiendo en los próximos años”, concluye la experta.

Russia’s Wagner Group Quietly Moves into Africa

https://www.ridl.io/en/russia-s-wagner-group-quietly-moves-into-africa/

While many Western countries have a tradition of private military corporations (PMCs), Russia’s own history of PMCs and mercenaries is distinct. Furthermore, the distinction between the two leads to complex questions, particularly relating to the Wagner Group, an organization which acts as a PMC, but is in fact a mercenary outfit. From 2017 onwards, it has been slowly making its way into Africa, in countries such as the Central African Republic, Sudan and Libya.

Founded in 2013, the Wagner Group has gained significant name recognition over the past few years. It is headed by Dmitry Utkin, a former colonel of Russian military intelligence (GRU). And it is suspected to be funded and supported by Yevgeny Prigozhin. They are operational in the Central African Republic, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan, where they work both with the Russian government as well as independently.

Unlike well-known companies such as DynCorp and Blackwater, Russia does not have the same domestic rules and regulations that the USA requires for PMCs and private security companies. In fact, according to Maria Zabolotskaya, a member of the Legal Division of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “under Russian law, it is not possible to set up a PMC or use one abroad.” This is because PMCs are not regulated under Article 359 of the Russian Criminal Code, as mercenaries and their financing are not allowed. Furthermore, Article 208 prohibits the formation of armed groups – which is backed up by Article 13 of the Russian Constitution. However, these laws are neither followed nor enforced nor clearly understood by Russian law. Even an effort to pass a law in the Russian Duma in 2018 that would have defined PMCs in Russia was rejected by the Ministry of Defense.

How then does one explain the so-called Wagner Group or another well-known Russian private military company, the RSB Group? The answer lies in the distinction given between PMCs and mercenaries. Yet, it is not easy to answer given that it can be hard to distinguish between Russia’s legal private military contractors (PMCs) and state-sponsored mercenaries.

Many claim that the Wagner Group acts as a Russian paramilitary force. But it is more likely that what has made it effective is its ability to work closely with the Russian government due to Prigozhin’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Contrary to many other oligarchs, Prigozhin was not one of the known criminals who used the chaos of the 1990s to gain a foothold in the new power structure of Russia. He is known, instead, to work on “unsavory jobs.” One such example is the well-known Internet Research Agency, the agency responsible for interfering in the 2016 American presidential election, for which Prigozhin was both sanctioned and indicted by the US Justice Department. According to Lyubov Sobol, “He is not afraid of dirty tasks… he can fulfill any task for Putin, ranging from fighting the opposition to sending mercenaries to Syria… He serves certain interests in certain spheres and Putin trusts him.”

The transition to working in the shadowy world of mercenary work is hence no surprise. Particularly as Putin’s and Prigozhin’s relationship grows ever closer. Closer ties at the top may offer more opportunities for the Wagner Group to branch out and become more active. Though the Wagner Group suffered a setback in the Syrian battle of Deir Al-Zour, they are still active throughout Africa, the Middle East and Ukraine. Sudan and the Central African Republic are Wagner’s two large centers of influence; however, Yemen is not far behind. In September 2018, reports emerged confirming the deployment of the Russian mercenaries to Yemen. While its methods vary state per state, the business model used both in Syria and the Central African Republic is such that Wagner offers private troops to leaders, whether that be Syria President Bashar Al-Assad or Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera, in exchange for oil profits. However, the relationship between Wagner and Africa is far more complex than one simple business model.

Central African Republic

Perhaps the Wagner Group’s most ubiquitous presence is in the Central African Republic, due to the recent media onslaught. Three journalists, Orkhan Dzhemal, Aleksander Rastorguyev and Kirill Radchenko were killed in July 2018 while investigating the Wagner Group’s presence in the CAR. While there is no objective report stating that Wagner had anything to do with the murders, former Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky has alleged that he has proof of Russian involvement and if anything, this incident has brought the Wagner Group’s activities to a spotlight.

However, Russia and indirect Wagner presence in the CAR did not begin in 2018. As early as December 2017, Russia obtained a UN exemption to the CAR arms embargo. This allowed Russia to supply light weaponry in 2018. Weapons, though, were not the only export sent to the CAR. Russia also sent along military personnel. This included the Wagner Group to protect both the government as well as mining facilities. CAR President Faustin-Archange Touadera claimed the troops were to “train our forces in combating plunderers.” As recent as January 2019, the Minister of National Defense in the CAR also suggested a Russian military base might be upcoming. This development would add to Russia’s expansion on the African continent for a very small price. Russia’s foreign policy aims are ultimately to be recognized as a Great Power; part of that is expanding its global reach.

Sudan

Although the Central African Republic is host to most of the headlines for the Wagner Group’s presence in Africa, it was also reported in July 2018 that Russian soldiers were sighted in south Darfur. This was confirmed by Sudanese President Omar Bashir, who stated that “A big number of Russian specialists work in our country and this is why we highly praise the role your country plays in preparing Sudanese military personnel.” Again this presence is to be expected. Stratfor reported that the Wagner Group sent employees to Sudan in January 2018 to protect gold, uranium and diamond mines. In fact, Russian presence in Sudan was revealed as early as December 2017 when a video was published showing a Russian individual training Sudanese soldiers.

Yet as recent as December 2018, the Conflict Intelligence Team reported social media posts suggesting the Wagner Group was not only protecting assets, but also operating within Sudan’s cities. Photos from the region suggest Wagner Group operatives might be working with Sudanese military and security services. Furthermore, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova has stated as recently as January 23, 2019 that “according to our information, representatives of Russian private security companies, who have nothing to do with Russian state bodies, are operating in Sudan.” In this statement, Zakharova is referring to the Wagner Group and has claimed that the operations of these companies are purely for training Sudanese military and law enforcement staff.

Libya

The Wagner Group is also suspected of being present in Libya at the end of 2018. In a meeting between Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Libyan marshal Khalifa Haftar, Prigozhin was not only present but a full participant in discussing the possible transfer of further Wagner mercenaries to Libya. Moreover, Russian news outlet RBC confirmed Russian forces were already in Libya by October 2018 and supporting Haftar. This support includes allegedly dozens of special forces and two military bases in Tobruk and Benghazi.

The Wagner Group’s presence in Africa illustrates the benefits that mercenaries can offer Russia. It allows Russia to create an indirect military presence abroad subtly. It also takes away much of the risk that a normal incursion would involve. Given the uncertain domestic regulations within Russia, mercenaries offer the Russian government deniability for their actions. At the same time, they give Russia an instrument for completing tasks that otherwise impossible via legal routes. In Africa, mercenary outfits like the Wagner Group allow Russia to expand their influence without committing to the actual mission in question.

As armed conflict is not the main reason for Russia’s action in Africa, mercenaries are still a useful tool. It opens up the possibility of Russia as a partner in many of these states that need military support and resources. Russia is happy to provide these, for a price.

Russia’s ambitions to become a global power are stymied somewhat by increased sanctions by Western countries. However, with growing influence in Africa, Russia may be able to make the case that it does not matter what other countries within Europe as well as the United States believe international norms preclude. Rather, it may argue that expanding its global reach and ambitions can occur without the support of the current international world order.