E.N.O.T. Corp - Hybrid Warfare Scenario and the Russian Projection

The nationalist groups or mercenaries are turning back to the ideological mercenary, that fights for a reason, with different service offers by PMCs, and focused in armed conflicts to support a flag, ideology, as these nationalist personal are not in the military or police.

The case of AZOV for exemple, as it's the case of training camps in Russia by private forces or also, the European Security Academy, training ultras.

Kremlin invested in patriocit camps for the youth in Eastern Europe to promote military and tactical training to the youngsters. The military Zlatibor 2018 camp for youth aged 12 to 23, organized by the Russian ultranationalist E.N.O.T. Corp.

This group has a strong taste for mercenary and paramilitary activities in Eastern Ukraine. E.N.O.T. Corp is involved in secret combat with ultra-nationalists and is promoting patriotic incursions against the Ukraine nationalist militias.

Zlatibor camp organizer Zeljo Vukelic, a Serbian war veteran, admitted that the military camp has received support from the Russian embassy in Serbia and that the army officer serving with the embassy has paid a visit.

Camps such as the one at Zlatibor provide predominantly military and tactical training and its supervised by the E.N.O.T. Corpo representative Alexey Saburov, instructor with paramilitary experience and promoted with the company active in Ukraine Russian mercenary presence.

E.N.O.T. Corp develops patriotic clubs in Serbia and Eastern Europe. In Grodno, Western Belarus, the patriotic Slavs and Outfit clubs under the auspices of the local Orthodox church are running a training camp, where youth are introduced to tactical and automatic weapons techniques.

Also, in Russia, E.N.O.T. Corp in insolved with local fighters that are involved with neo-pagan militias and skinheads, to promote local autonomy and nationalism, structured by local tradition.

The participants are not afraid to call Belarus “Western Russia” when posting their propaganda on Russian social media.

In 2015, there were at least five patriotic and orthodox clubs in the Grodno region. All of these clubs are brazenly pro-Russian ultranationalist in orientation and keen to recruit youth, even the so-called “troubled children” associated with aggression and broken homes.

In Bulgaria at Vasil Levski, the paramilitary Committee for National Salvation, and the Shipka Bulgarian National Movement that drew attention in the summer of 2016.

Despite Bulgaria being an E.U. member, these organizations have developed surprisingly strong activities in the country’s border region with Turkey.

E.N.O.T Corp’s story is closely connected to the persona of the Muscovite Igor Mangushev, one-time leader of the non-registered Svetlaya Rus, the patriotic movement whose specialty by own admission was to create an “atmosphere of horror” for illegal immigrants in Moscow.

The militia is now taking a part of the plan to promote local warfare and civil unrest, promoting the destablization of a local governemt and paramilitary presence in security and national influence, and law application.

The formation of these Russian Nationalists as Mercenaries put Russia into an advantage to promote more than one front in different parts of the Globe. For exemple fight one front in Ukraine, another front in Syria and a new front in Lybia now.

Нэанацысцкі баявік Мільчакоў: у «Русіча» вялікія інтарэсы, зьвязаныя зь Беларусьсю

https://www.svaboda.org/a/27742409.html

Кіраўнік атраду расейскіх нацыяналістаў Аляксей Мільчакоў пацьвердзіў Свабодзе, што ён і ягоныя паплечнікі займаюцца ваеннай падрыхтоўкай беларускіх дзяцей і што ўлады Беларусі гэтаму не перашкаджаюць.

Пра тое, што беларускіх дзяцей зь Віцебска, Друцка і Талачына сёлета вазілі ў Расею на ваенныя зборы, якія праводзілі баевікі дывэрсійна-штурмавой выведвальнай брыгады «Русіч» і асабіста яе камандзір Аляксей Мільчакоў, першай паведаміла газэта «Наша Ніва».

Паводле інфармацыі «Нашай Нівы», беларускіх школьнікаў накіроўвалі на зборы праз Талачынскае «Праваслаўнае ваенна-патрыятычнае братэрства імя сьвятых праведных князёў Барыса і Глеба прыхода храма Ўвядзеньня ў храм Прасьвятой багародзіцы», «Казацкі» клюб «Вароты Паазер’я», Друцкі «Праваслаўны ваенна-патрыятычны клюб імя Архангела Міхаіла», а таксама ваенна-патрыятычны клюб «Школа выжываньня» пры віцебскай арганізацыі аўганцаў «Братэрства».

Свабода зьвярнулася з просьбай пракамэнтаваць публікацыю «Нашай Нівы» кіраўніка «Русіча» Аляксея Мільчакова.

«З боку беларускіх уладаў дрэннай рэакцыі не назіралася»

Аляксей Мільчакоў не аспрэчваў факты, агучаныя ў расьсьледаваньні «Нашай Нівы» і пацьвердзіў, што «Русіч» займаецца вайсковай падрыхтоўкай дзяцей. Мільчакоў толькі зьвярнуў увагу на тое, што ня лічыць сябе тэрарыстам, а «Русіч» — тэрарыстычнай арганізацыяй.

Мільчакоў зазначыў, што ўлады Беларусі ніяк не перашкаджалі ні адпраўцы беларускіх школьнікаў на трэніровачныя зборы, ні ў прынцыпе супрацоўніцтву «Русіча» зь беларускімі клюбамі і арганізацыямі.

«Мерапрыемствы агульныя і без палітычнага адценьня, і з боку ўладаў дрэннай рэакцыі не назіралася», — сказаў Мільчакоў.

На просьбу Свабоды больш падрабязна распавесьці пра сваё супрацоўніцтва зь беларускімі арганізацыямі і пра сваю працу на беларускім напрамку Мільчакоў адказаў адмовай, але адзначыў:

«У „Русіча“ вялікія інтарэсы, зьвязаныя зь Беларусьсю, і каб не было скандалаў (хаця іх і ўздымае, як я зразумеў, „майданутая вышывата“, якой меншасьць) і ў людзей не ўзьнікала нязручнасьцяў, я лепш пакіну гэта без адказу».

Мільчакоў паведаміў, што асабіста прыяжджаў у Беларусь, хаця ваенна-патрыятычныя зборы тут не праводзіў.

Ён дадаў, што «Русіч» не зьяўляецца арганізатарам трэніровачных лягераў — яны толькі працуюць там інструктарамі. Усімі арганізацыйнымі пытаньнямі займаецца так званая карпарацыя E.N.O.T.

«Русіч» і «E.N.O.T. Corp»: хто гэта?

І «Русіч», і «E.N.O.T. Corp» маюць рэпутацыю фашысцкіх і нэанацысцкіх арганізацыяў.

Дывэрсійна-штурмавая выведвальная група «Русіч» — баявы атрад расейскіх нацыяналістаў, які прымаў удзел у вайне на Данбасе.

«Русіч» спачатку ўваходзіў у групу хуткага рэагаваньня «Бэтмэн» (падразьдзяленьне, сумна вядомае выкраданьнямі, катаваньнямі і рабункамі мірных жыхароў), а потым у брыгаду «Вікінг». У чэрвені 2015 году кіраўніцтва «Русіча» прыняло рашэньне вывесьці атрад з Данбасу. У заяве, прысьвечанай гэтай падзеі, адзначалася, што байцоў «Русіча» чакае новая вайна: «У будучай вайне, якая бліжэй з кожным днём, здаровыя патрыятычныя сілы будуць як нельга дарэчы».

За камандзірам «Русіча» 25-гадовым ураджэнцам Пецярбурга Аляксеем Мільчаковым (пазыўны «Сэрб», мянушка «Фрыц») цьвёрда замацавалася рэпутацыя нэанацыста і садыста. Яшчэ ў 2012 годзе ён стаў вядомы на ўсю Расею пасьля таго, як выклаў у інтэрнэт фота, дзе адразае галаву шчанюку і робіць зь яго шашлык, а таксама пазіруе са сьцягам нацысцкай Нямеччыны.

Падчас вайны на Данбасе ягоная рэпутацыя стала яшчэ больш злавеснай. У забітых украінскіх салдат ён адразаў вушы, выразаў на іх тварах знак «калаўрат» (8-прамянёвая свастыка — эмблема «Русіча»), а таксама рабіў сэлфі на фоне згарэлых трупаў украінцаў. Фота сваіх «подзьвігаў» Мільчакоў выкладваў у сацыяльныя сеткі.

Намесьнік Мільчакова ў «Русічы» Ян Пятроўскі таксама любіць фатаграфавацца з трупамі ўкраінскіх байцоў, з нацысцкім прывітаньнем, а акрамя таго мае татуіроўкі з эмблемамі дывізій СС. Ён, як і Мільчакоў, асабіста ўдзельнічае ў падрыхтоўцы на ваенных зборах дзяцей — у тым ліку, дзяцей зь Беларусі.

Арганізатары трэніровачных збораў — «E.N.O.T. Corp» — гэта ваенізаваная нацыяналістычная арганізацыя, аснову якой склалі дзьве расейскія нацыянальна-патрыятычныя структуры: асацыяцыя «Рэзэрв» і грамадзкая арганізацыя «Сьветлая Русь». Да вайны на Данбасе байцы «E.N.O.T. Corp» у асноўным займаліся барацьбой зь нелегальнай міграцыяй у Расеі (як кажуць пра сябе самі Яноты, «арганізоўвалі нашу моладзь на чыстку вуліц ад усякай брыдоты»). «E.N.O.T. Corp» ня толькі рэгулярна праводзіць ваенныя зборы для дзяцей і моладзі, але яшчэ і мае сваё стала дзейнае ваенізаванае моладзевае падразьдзяленьне.

З пачаткам вайны на Данбасе баевікі «E.N.O.T. Corp» актыўна прымалі ўдзел у баявых дзеяньнях на фронце, а таксама выконвалі контарвыведніцкія функцыі ў тыле сэпаратыстаў і выведвальныя ва ўкраінскім тыле (гэта інфармацыя зьмяшчаецца ў роліку Янотаў на іх афіцыйным канале ў Ютубе).

Ёсьць сьведчаньні таго, што на базе гэтай нацыяналістычнай структуры дзейнічае паўнавартасная прыватная ваенная кампанія — паўлегальнае ваеннае падразьдзяленьне, якое курыруе ФСБ. Прычым байцы «E.N.O.T. Corp» ваююць ня толькі ва Ўкраіне, але і ў Сырыі. Пра гэта ў прыватнасьці паведамляюць экспэрты ўкраінскай групы «Інфармацыйны супраціў». Гэта пацьвярджае і інфаграфіка, разьмешчаная ў суполцы моладзевага падразьдзяленьня «E.N.O.T. Corp».

Assad Regime Militias and Shi’ite Jihadis in the Syrian Civil War

November 30, 2016 By Cody Roche

Translations: Русский

https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/11/30/assad-regime-militias-and-shiite-jihadis-in-the-syrian-civil-war/

The following collaboratively written article is the result of months of research in a joint project by Vincent Beshara and Cody Roche. Please save or open images in a new tab to see full details.

More than five years into the grueling Civil War, the landscape of actors in Syria has only become more complex. Much scrutiny and attention has been focused on the numerous rebel groups that have been spawned by the fighting and their backers. The rise of ISIS, the entrance of the American-led Coalition, and now the Turkish backed Euphrates Shield operation, have all added new actors on the ground to an already complex war. Until recently however, much less attention has been paid to the large array of actors fighting to maintain the Assad regime. For one reason or another, the topic has been largely undiscussed in detail, and when discussed, has been controversial. Yet while it is unclear exactly how many men (and in rarer cases, women) are members of the hundreds of loyalist militias, it is clear that not only is the number of members high, so is their importance—as of March 2015, it was estimated that regime manpower was made up of 125,000 regulars and 125,000 pro-government militia members (with the latter figure including foreign Jihadis fighting for the regime), and almost a year later it seems this balance has likely shifted in favor of the militias. As the situation stands today there does not exist a single front that is entirely held by the SAA. That is true from Deraa, up through Damascus to Aleppo, Hama and Latakia, and even out in the long cut-off outpost in Deir EzZor. We have compiled several infographics with over one hundred Syrian and foreign militia groups, in which every part of Syria is represented. These militias vary in size and importance. Some are no more than a few dozen men, perhaps encompassing and tied to a village or a neighborhood, highlighting the highly regional nature of this conflict on all sides. Other groups field a few thousand men, numerous pieces of armor and artillery, have a national presence, and even their own training camps and networks. Likewise, their ties to Damascus, and more importantly, the level of control Damascus exerts over them, varies.

As foreign support for Assad’s regime has increased, some sources have taken to claiming that the Syrian Arab Army (“SAA”) either no longer exists, or barely exists, with the fight being in the hands of the various foreign militias and military forces that have joined the fighting on Assad’s behalf. The importance of these foreign backers and fighters and the profound influence they have had on the Assad regime should not be ignored, and both their effect and the number of groups involved is eye-catching. From the Iranian and Russian military forces, to Lebanese Hezbollah and the various Iraqi militias, to Afghans and Pakistanis fighting in the Iranian backed groups, it is easy to see why such attention is paid to these groups. These foreigners have played key roles for the regime, including taking the lead in several important offensives. However, to state that foreigners are doing the bulk of the fighting among pro-Assad forces or that the SAA “no longer exists” is as hyperbolic and incorrect as the common regime apologist trope that the Free Syrian Army “no longer exists.” As is the case with the Syrian Opposition, Syrians continue to make up the bulk of the fighters doing most of the fighting, and dying, among pro-Assad forces. That is true across Syria. Likewise, the SAA continues to exist. However, the SAA today is not the SAA that started the war. It is a much diminished shell of itself, mustering less than half the manpower of the pre-Civil War figure of 300,000 and heavily supplemented by localized actors—the regime has “doubled down on the sectarian, tribal, and thuggish inclinations of its base” in order to remain viable. While much has been made of the large number of rebel groups, there has also been an explosion of non-SAA groups (or, militias) fighting on Assad’s side. It is these groups that are the focus of this article.

It is difficult to describe the array of loyalist militias, as they are as diverse as their counterparts among the Syrian Opposition. There are militias that can be described as Nationalists, such as the Homeland Shield Brigade [Liwa Dir’ al-Watan]. There are ethnic militias, like the numerous Palestinian militia groups, and militias organized along sectarian lines such as Shi’ite militia Liwa Imam al-Baqir or one of dozens of Druze militias. Likewise, numerous Alawite and Christian militias exist. There are militias organized along tribal lines, like Ussud al-Sharqiya made up of Shaitat tribe members. At least one all female militia is known to have existed, the Druze Labawat al-Jabal. Armed wings of extremist political parties exist such as the well-known fascist Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party and their Whirlwind Eagles militia [pictured above in Latakia late 2015], as well as that of the Assad regime affiliated Ba’ath Party and its Lebanese branch. Militias tied to outside powers have become increasingly common, like Quwat al-Ridha, one of a number of “Syrian Hezbollah” groups. There are militias which are simply raised and financed by wealthy Syrians, such as the groups created by the Jaber brothers in Latakia. There exist numerous militias who have ties to one of the Syrian intelligence services, or one of the “elite” Syrian military formations. Finally, there exists militias who legitimately would be considered no different than a criminal gang in a time of peace, even by the notorious standards of pre-Civil War Syria.

An example of the latter is Liwa Usad al-Hussein, led by Hassan al-Assad [pictured above]. Hassan’s now deceased father, Mohammed Toufic al-Assad, “founded” Lions of Hussein, a well armed Latakia based militia. Mohammed was nicknamed “Chief of the Mountain,” as before the war since the 80’s he ran smuggling networks in much of Latakia. His group had been tied to kidnappings and extortion. Now with the war, his network has been re-branded as a loyalist militia which has fought everywhere from east Homs to Latakia, although it has continued its criminal activities on the side. As an example of the volatile nature of these types of regime militias, Mohammed Toufic al-Assad met his end in March 2015 with 5 bullets to the head in an intra-regime dispute over influence in Qardaha Latakia. This regime infighting is a recurring theme, as the recent murder of a prominent commander of a Tiger Forces group by other loyalists in Tartous demonstrates. What is left of the regular SAA complain bitterly of the pay imbalance and the incentives militia members are given, stating “How do you not feel oppressed when you see people joining these [reserve] militias and getting paid more than you?” Both regime reporters and pro-regime activists have complained of mass looting by regime militias.

For several reasons, the regime militia infographic is likely a large under count of the actual number of loyalist Syrian militias active in Syria. For one, given the nature of this article trying to visualize groups by presenting logos, we have had to exclude numerous groups we know of that do not have logos. Another issue is the general lack of information on loyalist militias in Syria. Partially due to the lack of attention they have received, observers and media often use the general terms “SAA” or “NDF” to blanket describe any loyalist fighters who are Syrian, ignoring the true composition of forces. This is also due to the lesser amount of emphasis many put on advertising themselves as opposed to how many rebel groups operate. Many groups do not even operate official media pages, let alone produce logos. This is a notable difference to Syrian Opposition groups who meticulously document events such as the formation of new groups, and the use of weapons such as Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and Grads. A key difference found in this project is that the regime militias tend to favor more insular Facebook social media, in stark contrast to the FSA and their embracement of Twitter. As such, the hundred plus logos we have compiled here are undoubtedly a large under count, although they are mostly made up of more important groups. The scope of this article is limited, and as such we will not being taking a close look into any individual group, or group of militias, nor will we look into some of the networks supporting militias. Beyond highlighting the existence and importance of pro-Assad militias, this article will look at the use of heavy weapons by loyalist militias, direct Russian involvement with the militias and the presence of Syrian as well as foreign Shi’ite sectarian militias.